Efficient Contracting in Cloud Service Markets with Asymmetric Information - A Screening Approach

Knapper, Rico; Conte, Tobias; Sailer, Anca; Kochut, Andrzej; Mohindra, Ajay

doi:10.1109/cec.2011.43

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…For instance, in [20], the authors study the use of contract theory as a means to optimize the economic revenues of a cloud server in a mobile cloud computing environment. Existing works such as [21], [22], and [23] focus on the efficiency of the resource allocation in cognitive radio networks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Device-to-Device Communications in Cellular Networks

Zhang

Song

Saad

et al. 2015

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

245

114

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Device-to-device (D2D) communication is viewed as one promising technology to boost the capacity of wireless networks and the efficiency of resource management. D2D communication heavily depends on the participation of users in sharing contents. Thus, it is imperative to introduce new incentive mechanisms to motivate such user involvement. In this paper, a contract-theoretic approach is proposed to solve the problem of providing incentives for D2D communication in cellular networks. First, using the framework of contract theory, the users' preferences towards D2D communication are classified into a finite number of types, and the service trading between the base station and users is properly modeled. Next, necessary and sufficient conditions are derived to provide incentives for users' engagement in D2D communication. Finally, our analysis is extended to the case in which there is a continuum of users. Simulation results show that the contract can effectively incentivize users' participation, and increase capacity of the cellular network than the other mechanisms.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Device-to-Device Communications in Cellular Networks

Zhang

Song

Saad

et al. 2015

IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.

245

114

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Contract theory has been applied in some other areas.The work in [19] brings the contract theoretical model into the area of cloud computing. The authors highlight economic factors and their goal is to optimize the revenue of cloud server, taking into consideration of users' valuation of server's various characteristics in market.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Offloading in Software Defined Network at Edge with Information Asymmetry: A Contract Theoretical Approach

Zhang

Liu

et al. 2015

J Sign Process Syst

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The proliferation of highly capable mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets has significantly increased the demand for wireless access. Software defined network (SDN) at edge is viewed as one promising technology to simplify the traffic offloading process for current wireless networks. In this paper, we investigate the incentive problem in SDN-at-edge of how to motivate a third party access points (APs) such as WiFi and smallcells to offload traffic for the central base stations (BSs). The APs will only admit the traffic from the BS under the precondition that their own traffic demand is satisfied. Under the information asymmetry that the APs know more about own traffic demands, the BS needs to distribute the payment in accordance with the APs' idle capacity to maintain a compatible incentive. First, we apply a contracttheoretic approach to model and analyze the service trading between the BS and APs. Furthermore, other two incentive mechanisms: optimal discrimination contract and linear pricing contract are introduced to serve as the comparisons of the anti adverse selection contract. Finally, the simulation results show that the contract can effectively incentivize APs' participation and offload the cellular network traffic. Furthermore, the anti adverse selection contract achieves the optimal outcome under the information asymmetry scenario.

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“…Due to the information asymmetries that are present in cloud computing, the vendor sees the market as a whole but the client only knows its own demand (Stantchev and Tamm 2012). There are ample opportunities for process-perfecting third-party information and data analytics providers to enter the market, increase vendor and client informedness, and improve their welfare (Knapper et al 2011 An intermediary's position in a technology ecosystem is determined by its viability and sustainability. The intermediary will demonstrate viability when it creates economic value for other participants in the ecosystem (e.g., buyers and suppliers in supply chain management, or clients and vendors in cloud computing) in excess of the value produced in its absence.…”

Section: Research Directions For Cloud Computing Mechanism Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Financification of Cloud Computing: An Agenda for Pricing and Service Delivery Mechanism Design Research

Kauffman

Shang

et al. 2014

STCC

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Pricing approaches to cloud computing services balance risks and interests between vendor and client, and optimize supply and consumption in terms of cost, uncertainty and economic efficiency. They also leverage the benefits of various services delivery mechanisms for reserved, on-demand, spot-price, and re-sold services in markets that have learned how to transact in full contracts and services instances. This is like a financial market: with services supply and demand, and opportunities to supply and purchase services with spot prices, or to sell or buy contracts for the delivery of future services. Our research suggests that the financification of the cloud computing services market represents a fundamental shift from the traditional model of software sales and large contracts outsourced to services vendors, to short-term contracts and computing capacity provision mechanism designs that are evolving similar to financial markets. We develop this perspective to explain the cloud vendor market, the provision of services, and the ways in which the financification of cloud computing will shape future offerings and the structure of the market. We see these changes in the market in the many ways that vendors offer cloud services of high value to organizations, while making more profitable business models possible.

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Efficient Contracting in Cloud Service Markets with Asymmetric Information - A Screening Approach

Cited by 7 publications

References 19 publications

Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Device-to-Device Communications in Cellular Networks

Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Device-to-Device Communications in Cellular Networks

Offloading in Software Defined Network at Edge with Information Asymmetry: A Contract Theoretical Approach

On the Financification of Cloud Computing: An Agenda for Pricing and Service Delivery Mechanism Design Research

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