Efficient authenticated multi-service group key management for secure wireless mobile multicast

A New Multiple Service Key Management Scheme for Secure Wireless Mobile Multicast

“…In SMGKM the key management tasks is offloaded to the intermediate cluster managers called Area Key Distributors which establish the necessary key management keys. SMGKM integrate our concept of session key distribution list(SKDL) introduced in [8] for fast and secure authenticated handover along with initial key establishment. SMGKM employ a lighter symmetric encryption suitable for resource constraint mobile devices than heavier asymmetric effort.…”

“…Using our SKDL concept introduced in [8], DKD initially derives the necessary cryptographic keys on group setup and the rest is handled at the cluster level. After successfully registration of mobile receivers Mi subscribed to diverse multicast services and knowing their mobility pattern, DKD initially derives the Mi short term individual AKDi specific session keys (SKMi_AKDi) depending on the Mi mobility pattern.…”

Multi-Service Group Key Management for High Speed Wireless Mobile Multicast Networks

“…Eventually when these users leave or drop the subscriptions after multiple visits, this triggers repeated rekeying of the entire keys (TEKs and local KEKs) held by the highly mobile users in all the previously visited clusters for forward secrecy hence causing extra rekeying signalling load in the network. Additionally, during frequent handoffs, the schemes also require synchronisation with the trusted Domain Key Distributor (DKD) for requesting the TEK during rekeying, user authentication as well as for tracking mobility hence the name key-request schemes [4,12]. The DKD in key-request schemes controls the entire local cluster managers called the Area Key Distributors in a decentralised environment.…”

A Multi-service Cluster-Based Decentralized Group Key Management Scheme for High Mobility Users

“…M 9 have previously visited AKD 5 and AKD 0 before leaving at AKD 2 . Similarly, M 5 have previously visited AKD 4 , AKD 3 and AKD 0 before leaving at AKD 1 . The assumption is that all M i in G K follow the same mobility pattern and the SMGKM has already carried out the multi-service rekeying strategy based on Key Update Slots (KUS) [7,8] to satisfy backward secrecy during frequent handoffs at the visited AKD v and forward secrecy where M 1 , M 2 , M 5 and M 9 currently leaves.…”

“…Eventually when users leave or drop the subscriptions after multiple visits, this triggers repeated rekeying of the entire keys (TEKs and local KEKs) held by the user in all the previously visited clusters for forward secrecy hence causing extra rekeying signalling overhead. During frequent handoffs, the schemes also require synchronisation with the trusted Domain Key Distributor (DKD) for requesting the TEK as well as for tracking mobility hence the name key-request schemes [3] which are Decleene et al [4], GKMF [5] and Kellil et al [6]. The DKD in key-request schemes controls the entire local cluster managers called the Area Key Distributors in a decentralised environment.…”