Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks

Xu, Ping; Li, Xiangyang; Tang, Shaojie

doi:10.1109/tc.2010.241

Cited by 47 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…As another line of spectrum reuse, temporal reuse is considered in some online-auction-model studies. [41][42][43][44][45] However, there are very few work that pay attention on both spatial and temporal reuse. Huang et al 6,46 first proposed a near-optimal truthful spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee, which jointly considered spatial and temporal reuse.…”

Section: Studies On Auction Theory For Wireless Communicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Variable bandwidth spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee

Sun

Zhang

et al. 2016

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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Spectrum resource is experiencing a rapid growth, which cannot meet the demand of the ever-increasing wireless communications technologies in recent years. Spectrum auctions in the secondary market have been considered as a prominent way to solve this challenge due to its fairness and effectiveness. However, most of the existing studies mainly focus on allocating spectrum in units of channels without considering allocate spectrum with variable bandwidths to the secondary users, which has been supported by the software-defined radio technologies. Variable bandwidth trading can make the usage of spectrum more flexible and efficient. Thus, we study the spectrum auction problem where the primary user wants to share a continuous spectrum with the secondary users, and each secondary user has a fixed transmission demand. The target of this work is to design a truthful auction mechanism, which can allocate spectrum with variable bandwidths to the secondary users and maximize the social efficiency at the same time. We first propose a bidmonotone winner determination mechanism to decide the winning secondary users in the auction. Since the optimal winner determination problem is NP-hard, we prove that the proposed mechanism has an approximation factor of 10. Then, a channel allocation mechanism is proposed, which can allocate spectrum to winners without interference. Finally, we compute the critical value for each winner to ensure truthfulness. We can demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism is truthful through theoretical analysis. We also perform extensive simulations to study the performance of the proposed auction mechanism, and the simulation results corroborate our theoretical analysis.

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Section: Studies On Auction Theory For Wireless Communicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Variable bandwidth spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee

Sun

Zhang

et al. 2016

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

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“…They also showed how to design truthful mechanism based on those methods. Xu and Li et al [21], [22] then designed online spectrum auction mechanisms when only secondary users could be selfish. Zhou et al [25] propose a truthful and efficient dynamic spectrum auction system to serve many small players.…”

Section: Literature Reviewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[11], [14], [22], [25]) only considered single-sided spectrum auctions, which assume that primary users will always trust the central authority and be satisfied with the outcome of the auction. However, in practice, primary users are usually selfish and want to participate in the auction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

TODA: Truthful Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks

Wang

et al. 2010

2010 IEEE Symposium on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum (DySPAN)

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135

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Abstract-The spectrum usage by a secondary user often happens in a certain geographical region and in a certain time interval, and the requests often come in an online fashion. Considering the selfish behaviors of primary users and secondary users, it is imperative to design online double spectrum auction methods. The most significant challenge is how to make the online double auction economic-robust (truthful in particular). Unfortunately, existing designs either do not consider the online requests or become untruthful when applied to scenarios when both primary users and secondary users could be selfish.In this paper, we address this problem by proposing TODA, a general framework for truthful online double auction for spectrum allocation. We assume that there is a central auctioneer, and the arrivals of secondary users' requests follow Poisson distribution. Upon receiving online spectrum requests, the central auctioneer will decide immediately which secondary and primary users will win the auction, and match winning primary users and secondary users, as well as decide how much secondary users should pay and primary users should get. To preempt existing spectrum usage is not allowed. We study the case in which the conflict graph of secondary users is a complete graph, which occurs in the urban area where the distribution of the secondary users is very dense. In this case, we design strategyproof (truthful) mechanisms for both the primary users and secondary users. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design truthful online double auction mechanisms for spectrum allocation. Our simulation results show that the expected social efficiency ratio of our mechanism is always above 80% compared with the off-line VCG mechanism and the spectrum utilization ratio is around 70% when the system is highly loaded.

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“…Yuan et al [37] introduced the concept of a timespectrum block to model spectrum reservation in cognitive radio networks, and presented both centralized and distributed protocols for spectrum allocation and show that these protocols are close to optimal in most scenarios. Li et al [24], [35] designed efficient methods for various dynamic spectrum assignment problems. They also showed how to design truthful mechanism based on those methods.…”

Section: Literature Reviewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

SALSA: Strategyproof Online Spectrum Admissions for Wireless Networks

Wang

2010

IEEE Trans. Comput.

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Abstract-It is imperative to design efficient and effective online spectrum allocation methods since requests for spectrums often come in an online fashion. In this paper, we propose SALSA, strategyproof online spectrum admission for wireless networks. We assume that the requests arrival follows the Poisson distribution. Upon receiving an online spectrum request, our protocol will decide immediately whether to grant its exclusive usage or not, and how much the request should pay. Preempting existing spectrum usage is not allowed. We proposed two protocols that have guaranteed performances for two different scenarios: 1) random-arrival case: the bid values and requested time durations follow some distributions that can be learned, or 2) semi-arbitrary-arrival case: the bid values could be arbitrary, but the request arrival sequence is random. We analytically prove that our protocols are strategyproof, and are both approximately social efficient and revenue efficient. Our extensive simulation results show that they perform almost optimum. Our method for semi-arbitrary-arrival model achieves social efficiency and revenue efficiency almost 20-30 percent of the optimum, while it has been proven that no mechanism can achieve social efficiency ratio better than 1=e ' 37 percent. Our protocol for the randomarrival case even achieves social efficiency and revenue efficiency two-six times the expected performances by the celebrated VCG mechanism.

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Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks

Cited by 47 publications

References 26 publications

A Variable bandwidth spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee

A Variable bandwidth spectrum auction mechanism with performance guarantee

TODA: Truthful Online Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Networks

SALSA: Strategyproof Online Spectrum Admissions for Wireless Networks

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