Efficient and Robust Identity-Based Handoff Authentication in Wireless Networks

Han, Qi; Zhang, Yinghui; Chen, Xiaofeng; Li, Hui; Quan, Jiaxiang

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34601-9_14

Cited by 18 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…To address the above challenges, the efficiency of the three-party approach has been improved by the two-party protocols proposed later [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13] in which the need to communicate with AS is completely eliminated. In [6], Yang et al present universal authentication protocols to preserve user anonymity against both eavesdroppers and APs.…”

Section: Existing Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As reported in [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13], a secure and efficient handover authentication should satisfy the following nine properties: • Subscription validation: An AP must authenticate MNs to ensure their legitimacy. • Server authentication: An MN is sure about the identity of the visited AP.…”

Section: Requirementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Later, it was demonstrated that the schemes of [6] cannot satisfy user untraceability, and a novel roaming authentication protocol based on verifier-local revocation group signature technique with backward unlinkability was proposed in [7] to remedy this problem. Recently, several lightweight handover authentication schemes [8][9][10] have been presented through using chameleon hash functions. In these schemes, each AP generates a chameleon hash function on a message from an MN to authenticate the MN.…”

Section: Existing Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Handover authentication has been an active field of research, resulting in many interesting protocols [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]. However, as an MN generally has limited power and processing capability, some of the proposed protocols are not suitable for the tight authentication time limit imposed on mobile networks.…”

Section: Existing Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, privacy of MNs should be preserved. Otherwise, their private information disclosed in the handoff process may be exploited by APs.In the literature, a number of handover authentication protocols have been proposed for mobile networks [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. However, they do not adequately address the above issues.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Handover authentication for mobile networks: security and efficiency aspects

Chan

Guizani

2015

IEEE Network

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handover authentication protocol enables mobile nodes (e.g., laptop PCs, smartphones, and vehicles) to seamlessly and securely roam over multiple access points [1]. Regardless of the mobile networking technology involved, as shown in Fig. 1, a typical handover authentication scenario involves three parties: mobile nodes (MNs), access points (APs), and the authentication server (AS). Normally, there is an agreement between APs and the AS to support roaming services. An MN first needs to register with the AS, and then can connect to the nearest AP to access its subscribed services while it is moving. When the MN moves from the current AP (e.g., AP1) into a new AP (e.g., AP2), handover authentication should be performed at AP2. Through handover authentication, AP2 authenticates the MN to reject any access request by an unauthorized user. Also, a session key should be established between the MN and AP2 to protect the data subsequently exchanged over the connection.There are two major challenging issues in the design of handover authentication protocols. The first one is efficiency. On one hand, MNs generally have limited processing capability and power. On the other hand, in order to avoid connection disruption due to handover, a tight time limit is usually imposed on the handover process. For example, the IEEE suggests that the handover latency should be kept below 50 ms, of which the authentication process should not take more than 20 ms. Therefore, a handover authentication process is required to be computationally efficient. The second issue is security and privacy. While an authentication scheme aims to check the legitimacy of incoming MNs, it should also be designed to stand against security attacks [2] such as denialof-service (DoS) attacks. For example, if an AP needs to carry out expensive cryptographic operations during the authentication process, adversaries can exhaust its resources by sending it a large number of bogus access requests. Moreover, privacy of MNs should be preserved. Otherwise, their private information disclosed in the handoff process may be exploited by APs.In the literature, a number of handover authentication protocols have been proposed for mobile networks [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. However, they do not adequately address the above issues. Recently, a new handover authentication protocol called PairHand [12] has been proposed. It outperforms those protocols in terms of efficiency, security, and privacy. One of the distinguishing features of PairHand is that it only requires two handshakes between an MN and an AP during authentication, and does not involve any certificate as in a traditional public key cryptosystem.In this article, we first discuss the security and efficiency requirements of handover authentication protocols. Then we review the earlier proposed protocols, and discuss how their security weaknesses and efficiency problems are overcome by PairHand. Subsequently, a more novel handover authentication protocol, HashHand, is designed. While preserving the merits of PairHan...

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