Efficiency Loss for Variable Renewable Energy Incurred by Competition in Electricity Markets

Guo, Hongye; Chen, Qixin; Fang, Xichen; Li, Kai; Xia, Qing; Chen, Kang

doi:10.1109/tste.2019.2946930

Cited by 20 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Meanwhile, for the fully dispatchable generation units, their benefit is independent of the FRS price changes. Comparing the results for half-dispatchable (participants 6-10) and volatile units (participants [11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20] in Figure 9, it can be found that with the changes of the FRS price, the firm output will help generators secure more benefits. Thus, the proposed mechanism can motivate generators improve the controllability of the generation outputs.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spot electricity market design for a power system characterized by high penetration of renewable energy generation

Yang

Wen

Chen

et al. 2021

Energy Conversion and Econom

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The continuous growth of renewable generation in power systems brings serious challenges to electricity markets due to their characteristics different from conventional generation technologies. These challenges come from two dimensions, including short‐term (energy and ancillary service markets) and long‐term (long‐term bilateral and capacity markets) aspects. Under this background, the design of energy and ancillary service markets is studied for power systems with a high penetration level of variable renewable generation. In the proposed spot market mechanism, energy and frequency regulation service (FRS) bids are jointly cleared, where renewable generators are motivated to proactively manage the intermittency and uncertainty of their power outputs. The proposed market mechanism can also ensure the adequacy of FRS capacity for compensating variability of renewables. Besides, in order to ensure the execution of spot market clearing outcomes, this paper established a penalty scheme for mitigating the real‐time fluctuations of renewable generation outputs in the spot market. Differences between real‐time generation outputs and market clearing outcomes are managed within a certain limit by imposing the designed penalty prices on deviations. Finally, the feasibility and efficiency of the developed market mechanism and algorithms are manifested in the case studies.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spot electricity market design for a power system characterized by high penetration of renewable energy generation

Yang

Wen

Chen

et al. 2021

Energy Conversion and Econom

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“…To reduce imbalance costs, He et al propose cooperative participation of wind producers and energy storage and derive the bidding behaviors of the coalition in the energy and regulation market [15] . The strategic behaviors of wind producers who can withhold capacities on the excuse of prediction uncertainty have been studied [16,17] .…”

Section: Entry Of New Gaming Participantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The competition and equilibrium in power markets under decarbonization and decentralization

Chen

Fang

Guo

et al. 2022

iEnergy

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Equilibrium analysis has been widely studied as an effective tool to model gaming interactions and predict market results. However, as competition modes are fundamentally changed by the decarbonization and decentralization of power systems, analysis techniques must evolve. This article comprehensively reviews recent developments in modelling methods, practical settings and solution techniques in equilibrium analysis. Firstly, we review equilibrium in the evolving wholesale power markets which feature new entrants, novel trading products and multi-stage clearing. Secondly, the competition modes in the emerging distribution market and distributed resource aggregation are reviewed, and we compare peer-to-peer clearing, cooperative games and Stackelberg games. Furthermore, we summarize the methods to treat various information acquisition degrees, risk preferences and rationalities of market participants. To deal with increasingly complex market settings, this review also covers refined analytical techniques and agent-based models used to compute the equilibrium. Finally, based on this review, this paper summarizes key issues in the gaming and equilibrium analysis in power markets under decarbonization and decentralization.

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“…To clearly explain the BD strategy, we modify the original model and introduce new auxiliary non-negative variables P gr t and 𝜂 s . Given the indicator z s , benders cuts, that is, constraints (19) or (20) (18) such that (3)-( 6), (17) […”

Section: Bilinear Procurement Strategy Master Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…where W s,r,t is non-negative slack variables for WF r in responsive scenario s at period t. The objective function ( 23) is to minimize the sum of all slack variables. When Φ (k) s is larger than zero, a new bilinear feasibility cut constraints (19) will be added to the master problem.…”

Section: Feasibility Check Subproblem For Each Responsive Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

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Block‐based procurement model between retailers and wind farms in medium‐long term market

Zhao

Wang

Ding

et al. 2021

IET Generation Trans & Dist

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With the fast development of wind power generation, many countries actively encourage wind power to trade in the medium‐long term market. However, the traditional forward contracts from medium‐long term markets are only suitable to conventional power generation enterprises, instead of wind farms. To facilitate the accommodation of wind power in the medium‐long term market, this paper focuses on two problems: The framework of the block‐based forward contract trading method and the procurement strategy of retailers with block‐based contracts. First, a novel block‐based forward contract is proposed, where the time attributes, that is, starting and ending time, and power during each period are stipulated. Aggregating all the block‐based forward contracts will naturally form the power supply curve, which can provide boundary information for wind farms when they take part in other markets. Secondly, a chance‐constrained procurement strategy model is proposed for retailers, where the uncertainty of wind power generation, constraints of block‐based contracts, and quota obligations of retailers are considered. Furthermore, a bilinear Benders decomposition algorithm with a variant of Jensen's inequalities is applied to solve the proposed model. Finally, experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and method, which is computationally efficient in solving the chance‐constrained procurement strategy problem.

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Efficiency Loss for Variable Renewable Energy Incurred by Competition in Electricity Markets

Cited by 20 publications

References 33 publications

Spot electricity market design for a power system characterized by high penetration of renewable energy generation

Spot electricity market design for a power system characterized by high penetration of renewable energy generation

The competition and equilibrium in power markets under decarbonization and decentralization

Block‐based procurement model between retailers and wind farms in medium‐long term market

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