Efficiency Imperatives in a Fragmented Polity: Reinventing Local Government in Greece

Getimis, Panagiotis; Hlepas, Nikolaos

doi:10.1057/9780230289826_11

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…As far as territorial reforms are concerned, Baldersheim and Rose (2010, p. 14) state in fact that “the more comprehensive or the more deep-going change, the more likely that opposition and resistance will occur.” Among the large body of literature on this topic, if reducing the focus on municipalities and their reactions to functional rescaling reforms, some specific patterns of conflict (or factors of resistance) may be singled out. Personal interests may lead to an open obstructionism (Kerrouche, 2010; Getimis and Hlepas, 2010), when local elites are moved by their own electoral or power interests at the local level. The size of the local entities involved in the reform may trigger different reactions (Kerrouche, 2010; Getimis and Hlepas, 2010): usually small- and medium-sized municipalities may resist functional rescaling due to their opportunity of benefiting from free riding and spillover (Hanes et al , 2012) but they can also be willing to accept it because they may realize significant scale economies (Steiner, 2003).…”

Section: Patterns Of Conflict and Resistance To Rescalingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Personal interests may lead to an open obstructionism (Kerrouche, 2010; Getimis and Hlepas, 2010), when local elites are moved by their own electoral or power interests at the local level. The size of the local entities involved in the reform may trigger different reactions (Kerrouche, 2010; Getimis and Hlepas, 2010): usually small- and medium-sized municipalities may resist functional rescaling due to their opportunity of benefiting from free riding and spillover (Hanes et al , 2012) but they can also be willing to accept it because they may realize significant scale economies (Steiner, 2003). Moreover, small municipalities may suffer a lack of organizational and administrative resources and this can also be a push factor toward the acceptance of rescaling reforms.…”

Section: Patterns Of Conflict and Resistance To Rescalingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Municipal reaction to functional rescaling in Italy

Bolgherini

Casula

Marotta

2018

IJPSM

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to discuss the municipal reaction to a recent rescaling policy in Italy that, since 2010, require to small municipalities to jointly manage their basic tasks (compulsory joint management – CJM) through intermunicipal forms of cooperation. The paper will investigate: how many small municipalities did effectively join their basic tasks; which forms of cooperation did they choose to perform these tasks; and which kind of reaction municipalities enacted toward the national provision. Design/methodology/approach Quantitative data rely on an original database collecting information on all Italian municipalities up to 2015. A qualitative research has also been conducted by submitting a semi-structured questionnaire and interviews to the civil servants in charge of the CJM in each of the 20 Italian regions and to other privileged interlocutors. Findings Italian municipalities poorly complied with the CJM norm and when they did, they choose the easiest way to do it (using the simplest available intermunicipal cooperation form). Among the explanations for this reaction: the lack of consistency and clear political will of the national policy maker in respect to this norm and the lack of a mind set at the local level oriented to cooperation and networking. Originality/value This paper highlights the main patterns of conflict in functional rescaling of small-sized municipalities in Italy, thus providing both fresh new data on this phenomena and useful elements for shaping future policy making on this topic.

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