Effects of working memory load on uncertain decision-making: evidence from the Iowa Gambling Task

Abstract

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) simulates uncertain gains and losses in real life situations and thus is a good measure of uncertain decision-making. The role of working memory (WM) in IGT performance still remains unclear. The present study aimed to examine the effect of WM on IGT performance. Three groups of participants matched on gender ratio were randomly assigned to no WM load, low WM load, and high WM load conditions. Initially the three groups did not show significant difference in WM capacity. They finished a modified version of IGT and then their implicit learning effect and explicit cognition on IGT were assessed. Results indicated a linear increasing trend of IGT performance among high WM load, low WM load and no WM load groups; participants in the no WM load and low WM load groups revealed implicit learning effect, while participants in the high WM load group did not; all participants showed explicit cognition on IGT to the same level. These results suggested that participants in the high WM load group showed good explicit cognition to IGT but showed poor performance. This pattern is similar to frontal patients. Further studies should be conducted to explore this issue.

The system neurophysiological basis of non‐adaptive cognitive control: Inhibition of implicit learning mediated by right prefrontal regions

“…While the main effect of cognitive control requirements could be seen as support for the limited capacity approach put forward by Bocanegra and Hommel [2014] or Cui et al [2015], the interaction found for the response-locked P3 does not match this account: Mirroring the interaction observed at the behavioral level, the predictive feature further increased response-locked P3 amplitudes in case of low control requirements (as compared with the nonpredictive baseline condition), but did not make a difference when cognitive control requirements were high (compare Fig. While the main effect of cognitive control requirements could be seen as support for the limited capacity approach put forward by Bocanegra and Hommel [2014] or Cui et al [2015], the interaction found for the response-locked P3 does not match this account: Mirroring the interaction observed at the behavioral level, the predictive feature further increased response-locked P3 amplitudes in case of low control requirements (as compared with the nonpredictive baseline condition), but did not make a difference when cognitive control requirements were high (compare Fig.…”

“…Hence, one could argue that "free" processing capacities were signaled by enhanced BA18/19 activation. While the main effect of cognitive control requirements could be seen as support for the limited capacity approach put forward by Bocanegra and Hommel [2014] or Cui et al [2015], the interaction found for the response-locked P3 does not match this account: Mirroring the interaction observed at the behavioral level, the predictive feature further increased response-locked P3 amplitudes in case of low control requirements (as compared with the nonpredictive baseline condition), but did not make a difference when cognitive control requirements were high (compare Fig. 5).…”

“…This confirms that the manipulation of (effortful) cognitive control demands was effective and resulted in two different tasks despite the fact that both tasks used exactly the same stimuli and that the task rules were (theoretically) arbitrary. Limited response selection resources or working memory capacities could supposedly be "used up" by the task demands in case of high cognitive control, so that the beneficial information of the predictive feature is blocked from the response selection stage and thus can no longer impinge on behavior [e.g., Cui et al, 2015;Joyce, 2016]. Most importantly, however, the predictive feature only conveyed an advantage (i.e., improved accuracy) in case of low control demands, but not in case of high control demands.…”

“…There are two possible explanations for this effect. Limited response selection resources or working memory capacities could supposedly be "used up" by the task demands in case of high cognitive control, so that the beneficial information of the predictive feature is blocked from the response selection stage and thus can no longer impinge on behavior [e.g., Cui et al, 2015;Joyce, 2016]. In case of low control demands, there would however still be capacities left for the exploration of additional available implicit information.…”

Improving children’s affective decision making in the Children’s Gambling Task

“…The roles of conscious and nonconscious processes in advantageous responding on the IGT have been controversial (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997;Cui et al, 2015;Maia & McClelland, 2004). Proponents of the somatic marker hypothesis claim that conscious awareness emerges as the task progresses and that advantageous choices are made before conscious awareness of the advantageous decks is demonstrated.…”