Effects of promotion cost sharing policy with the sales learning curve on supply chain coordination

Tsao, Yu‐Chung; Sheen, Gwo-Ji

doi:10.1016/j.cor.2011.07.009

Cited by 108 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…So far, many coordinative contracts have been proposed for supply chain coordination, such as, revenue sharing (Alaei and Setak 2015;Qin and Yang 2008), cost sharing (Tsao and Sheen 2012), revenue and cost sharing (Panda 2013), buyback (Heydari et al 2017;Pasternack 2008), combined buyback and quantity discount (Heydari and Norouzinasab 2015;Parthasarathi et al 2011), quantity flexibility (Tsay 1999), lead time induced contract (Heydari 2014a;Heydari et al 2016), delay in payments contract (Heydari 2015), and pricing schemes and discount contracts (Chaharsooghi et al 2011;Heydari 2014b). Instead, there are few works which studied how to design a coordinative contract to motivate the supply chain members to share their information.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive mechanism based on cooperative advertising for cost information sharing in a supply chain with competing retailers

2017

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This paper proposes a new motivation for information sharing in a decentralized channel consisting of a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer provides a common product to the retailers at the same wholesale price. Both retailers add their own values to the product and distribute it to consumers. Factors such as retail prices, values added to the product, and local advertising of the retailers simultaneously have effect on market demand. Each retailer has full information about the own added value which is unknown to the manufacturer and other retailer. The manufacturer uses a cooperative advertising program for motivating the retailers to disclose their private information. A numerical study is presented to compare different scenarios of information sharing. Computational results show that there is a condition in which full information sharing is beneficial for all members of the supply chain through cooperative advertising program and, therefore, retailers have enough incentive to disclose their cost information to the manufacturer.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive mechanism based on cooperative advertising for cost information sharing in a supply chain with competing retailers

2017

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“…They obtained channel coordination through combined quantity discount and advertising cost sharing contracts. Moreover, Tsao and Sheen (2012) formulated a two-stage SC including one supplier and two competing retailers. In their model, two retailers compete with each other on promotion effort.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of cooperative promotion efforts with competing retailers in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain

Johari¹,

Hosseini‐Motlagh²

2018

10.5267/j.uscm

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In this paper, the issue of cooperative (co-op) promotion efforts is addressed in a two-stage supply chain (SC). The investigated SC includes one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers facing different market demands. The customers' demand is affected by both advertising efforts of the manufacturer and two retailers. Moreover, the retailers compete with each other on local advertising investments within the market. In order to boost the retailers' advertising level, it is assumed that the manufacturer pays a ratio of the retailers' advertising expenditures. We propose four non-cooperative game scenarios and one cooperative game. Non-cooperative models are established through both Stackelberg and Nash game between two echelons. Moreover, both Cournot and Collusion behaviors are assumed to be followed by two retailers. We develop a promotion cost sharing contract to achieve the channel coordination. Under cooperation model, all SC members seek to reach the highest profit for the entire SC by considering the bargaining power of the SC participants. In each game scenario the optimal solution and unique equilibrium are determined. In addition, a comparison on the advertising level of all SC members along with the value of participation rate are provided. In addition, the feasibility of the cooperative game is discussed and resulted.

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“…Analyzing the research on the supply chain coordination mechanism, the literature mainly focuses on such aspects as pricing [24][25][26][27][28], quantity discount [29,30], information sharing [31,32], profit distribution [33][34][35], and cost sharing [36][37][38][39][40], analyzes supply chains under either centralized or decentralized decision-making, and provides coordination strategies. Although the literature on the supply chain coordination mechanism is rich, it rarely pays attention or neglects the CSR of supply chains, making it difficult for relevant CSR to satisfy the realistic requirements of supply chain management.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism with Cost Sharing of Corporate Social Responsibility

Liu

Quan

et al. 2018

Sustainability

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Abstract:The competition of modern enterprises has shifted from brand competition among enterprises of the past to that of supply chains; and considering corporate social responsibility (CSR) within supply chain management has become an inevitable requirement for improving the competitiveness of enterprises and conforms to the trend of standardization of social responsibility guidelines. This paper deals with channel coordination and decision-making in a CSR supply chain that is comprised of a dominant retailer and n homogeneous suppliers. The Stackelberg game is employed to analyze the optimal decision-making of this supply chain under either decentralized or centralized decision-making processes. After that, the thought and method of super conflict equilibrium are used to design the coordination decision-making mechanism of this supply chain based on the cost sharing of CSR to solve channel conflict and to optimize the decision. The results show that the proposed mechanism based on the cost sharing of CSR is better than those with only either the retailer or the suppliers being CSR; and it can well describe the relationship between the retailer and the suppliers, and increase the eagerness of the retailer and suppliers to carry out their CSR under various circumstances without having the profits adversely affected. As a matter of fact, this mechanism maximizes the profits of the entire supply chain system and also enhances the competitiveness of the chain.

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Effects of promotion cost sharing policy with the sales learning curve on supply chain coordination

Cited by 108 publications

References 28 publications

Incentive mechanism based on cooperative advertising for cost information sharing in a supply chain with competing retailers

Incentive mechanism based on cooperative advertising for cost information sharing in a supply chain with competing retailers

Coordination of cooperative promotion efforts with competing retailers in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain

A Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism with Cost Sharing of Corporate Social Responsibility

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