Effects of Government Subsidies on Production and Emissions Reduction Decisions under Carbon Tax Regulation and Consumer Low-Carbon Awareness

Wang, Weiling; Wang, Yongjian; Zhang, Xiaoqing; Zhang, Dalin

doi:10.3390/ijerph182010959

Cited by 20 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 48 publications

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“…Most of the above literature only considers a single carbon policy or compares the effects of different carbon policies. For mixed carbon policy, scholars often study carbon subsidies in combination with the other two policies [ 37 , 38 , 39 ]. Few scholars study the hybrid policy combination of carbon trading and carbon tax, which are becoming important lately [ 40 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Low-Carbon Transition Models of High Carbon Supply Chains under the Mixed Carbon Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Policy in the Carbon Neutrality Era

Shen

Lin

Cheng

2022

IJERPH

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To achieve the goals of carbon peak and carbon neutrality, the low-carbon transformation (LCT) of high-carbon firms is inevitable. We construct game models of a supply chain with different dominant types under a mixed carbon policy that embraces carbon cap-and-trade and carbon tax. Solving each dominant model, we derive the effective area and optimal threshold of the mixed carbon policy to guide LCT. We find that the selling price, market demand, and profit of the supply chain system are equal in different dominant models due to the mixed carbon policy, but when a company dominates the supply chain, its profit is higher than when it is a subordinate. In addition, the high-carbon manufacturers (HCM) will pursue LCT only when the sum of the carbon tax rates and carbon trading prices is within a certain threshold, and the subordinate HCM are more likely to be driven to pursue LCT. Therefore, the government should adopt a differentiated hybrid carbon policy, setting a high (low) carbon tax rate for the HCM in a dominant (subordinate) position.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Low-Carbon Transition Models of High Carbon Supply Chains under the Mixed Carbon Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Policy in the Carbon Neutrality Era

Shen

Lin

Cheng

2022

IJERPH

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“…As for incentive-punishment policies, more literature focused on the effect of government subsidies on carbon abatement investment decisions [ 5 , 12 , 38 , 39 ]. There are also a few studies concerned with the relationship between the government reward-punishment mechanism and low-carbon abatement activities.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lastly, this section further explores the effect of the carbon tax rate and the reward-punishment coefficient on the government’s optimal pre-determined carbon abatement target, the manufacturer’s abatement investment level, and the excessive abatement level. Referring to [ 39 ] and combined with an actual situation in practice, we set the base parameters as follows. For instance, parameter λ was equal to 0.2 ( λ = 0.2), which represents consumers’ preference degree for low-carbon products.…”

Section: Government’s Optimal Decisionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of a Mixed Emissions Control Policy on the Manufacturer’s Production and Carbon Abatement Investment Decisions

Wang¹,

Zhang

2022

IJERPH

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Considering the consumers’ environmental awareness, a mixed emissions control policy with carbon tax and a dynamic reward-punishment mechanism for carbon abatements was introduced to explore the manufacturer’s low-carbon production issues. The results showed that: (1) Under a given mixed emissions control policy, a higher government pre-determined abatement target cannot positively encourage manufacturers’ carbon abatement behaviors. However, a stricter emissions control policy is environmentally beneficial only when the government pre-determined abatement target exceeds a certain threshold. (2) Reducing the carbon abatement cost and enhancing the consumers’ environmental awareness would always benefit manufacturers’ low-carbon production, but both approaches benefit the environment only when the government pre-determined abatement target is below a certain threshold. (3) Under a mixed emissions control policy of social welfare maximization, the reward-punishment coefficient positively correlates with the government’s optimal pre-determined abatement target, and the effect of the carbon tax rate on that is closely related to the carbon emissions of the unit product. More importantly, imposing a carbon tax or raising the tax rate and adopting a reward-punishment mechanism or raising the reward-punishment coefficient can effectively encourage manufacturers’ carbon abatement investment behaviors. However, they have nothing but a negative effect on manufacturers’ excessive abatement levels.

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“…Wang et al [63] confirmed that manufactured can offset the negative economic impact of the carbon emission tax policy by making low carbon emission technology investment. Wang et al [64] investigated the different government subsidies on production and emission reduction decisions under a carbon tax regulation by formulating three optimization models.…”

Section: Carbon Tax Policy Of Clscmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Government Dual Policy on the Selection of OEM’s Regulatory Strategy for Third-Party Remanufacturing

Cheng

Li-jun

Huang

2022

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Remanufacturing plays an important role in the circular economy and environmental protection. In the development of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), the impact of government policy cannot be ignored. However, previous studies have rarely answered the impact of government dual policy (the policy combination of trade-old-for-remanufactured and carbon tax policy) on the optimal decisions of CLSC enterprises. To fill the gap, this work considers the remanufacturing modes and government dual policy simultaneously and investigates a CLSC of waste of electronic and electrical equipment (WEEE) consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a third-party remanufacturer (TPR). Here the OEM has three strategies for regulating third-party remanufacturing activities: outsourcing (Model O), authorization (Model A), and nonregulation (Model D). The results show that: (i) Whether the government implements the dual policy or not, Model O is the best choice for OEM. And compared with nongovernment policy intervention, government dual policy can improve the recovery rate of WEEE products and then effectively promote the recycling of waste resources; (ii) When the government dual policy parameters meet a certain condition, the dual policy could effectively increase supply chain members’ profits and the total profits of CLSC and boost market demand expansion; (iii) Compared with the other two remanufacturing modes, the CLSC under nonregulation strategy is the optimal remanufacturing mode for the whole society; meanwhile, OEM nonregulation strategy is the worst strategy for the environmental protection. In addition, when the government sets appropriate parameters, government dual policy is beneficial to the consumer, supply chain member, and the society simultaneously, but the impact of the dual policy on the environment is also related to the ratio of the two products’ impact on the environment.

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Effects of Government Subsidies on Production and Emissions Reduction Decisions under Carbon Tax Regulation and Consumer Low-Carbon Awareness

Cited by 20 publications

References 48 publications

Low-Carbon Transition Models of High Carbon Supply Chains under the Mixed Carbon Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Policy in the Carbon Neutrality Era

Low-Carbon Transition Models of High Carbon Supply Chains under the Mixed Carbon Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax Policy in the Carbon Neutrality Era

Effects of a Mixed Emissions Control Policy on the Manufacturer’s Production and Carbon Abatement Investment Decisions

The Impact of Government Dual Policy on the Selection of OEM’s Regulatory Strategy for Third-Party Remanufacturing

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