Effects of dynamic-Win-Stay-Lose-Learn model with voluntary participation in social dilemma

Shi, Zhenyu; Wei, Wei; Feng, Xiangnan; Zhang, Ruizhi; Zheng, Zhiming

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2021.111269

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…When Coexistence region: When the values of A are small, all three strategies are able to exist with moderate fractions. For A = 0, the fractions of the three strategies are fixed, and all are independent of b, which is similar as the result in [42]. The difference is that in [42], r C ≈ r D ≈ r l ≈ 0.33 (where l indicates the strategy of volunteering) when A = 0, but in our results, r C ≈ 0.33, r D ≈ 0.27, r J ≈ 0.4 as shown in fig.…”

Section: -Effects Of Coevolution Of Dynamic Aspiration and Justice St...supporting

confidence: 75%

“…For A = 0, the fractions of the three strategies are fixed, and all are independent of b, which is similar as the result in [42]. The difference is that in [42], r C ≈ r D ≈ r l ≈ 0.33 (where l indicates the strategy of volunteering) when A = 0, but in our results, r C ≈ 0.33, r D ≈ 0.27, r J ≈ 0.4 as shown in fig. 1, with arbitrary initial setting that all position patterns are evenly distributed on the lattice.…”

Section: -Effects Of Coevolution Of Dynamic Aspiration and Justice St...supporting

confidence: 75%

“…Consequently, we term this particular strategy the "justice strategy" within the context of this research. Regarding aspirations, while many studies assume fixed aspiration levels [41], incorporating dynamic aspirations [42] that fluctuate in response to variations in payoff levels can offer a more faithful representation of human behavior. By considering dynamic aspirations, we can capture the nuanced dynamics of human decision-making in response to changing incentives.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Justice strategy can promote cooperation with the joint of dynamic aspiration in social dilemma

Li,

Zhang,

Shi

et al. 2023

EPL

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We investigate the concurrent effect of the justice strategy and dynamic aspirations on cooperation in evolutionary game theory. The justice strategy refers to a game in which players play the role of cooperators in the case of cooperation, the role of punishers in the face of defection, and receive the same payoff as their opponents. Players compare the payoffs with their own dynamic aspirations to decide whether to change their strategy. Through simulations, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model in promoting cooperation and reducing or completely eliminating defections. A higher initial aspiration has a significant impact on reducing defection. Additionally, we find that diverse evolutionary dynamics arise from various initial settings. Remarkably, in specific situations, even a tiny initial fraction of justicers can rapidly retaliate and eventually dominate the entire system. Reflecting real-life scenarios, the influence of punishment typically lags behind the occurrence of defection, allowing justicers to gradually counteract defection upon its cluster emergence.

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Section: -Effects Of Coevolution Of Dynamic Aspiration and Justice St...supporting

confidence: 75%

Section: -Effects Of Coevolution Of Dynamic Aspiration and Justice St...supporting

confidence: 75%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Justice strategy can promote cooperation with the joint of dynamic aspiration in social dilemma

Li,

Zhang,

Shi

et al. 2023

EPL

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“…The issue of unequal resource allocation and social unfairness [15,16], which are important consequences of the Matthew effect, has received significant attention in the field of evolutionary cooperation, as evidenced by studies such as [17,18]. Of growing interest to scholars is the design of effective wealth distribution systems, since theoretical research has demonstrated their potential to address social dilemmas [19][20][21][22]. For example, the promotion of the common interest is evident when individuals are allowed to redistribute their contributions in accordance with their previous round earnings [23].…”

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confidence: 99%

Cumulative advantage is a double-edge sword for cooperation

Shi

Tao

et al. 2023

EPL

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The Matthew effect emphasizes the influence of early advantage on shaping long-term development by amplifying it over time, and its implications for public cooperation are yet to be fully understood. In this letter, we propose and study a spatial public goods game driven by cumulative advantage, where players who achieve high payoffs in a given round receive greater allocations in the next. The simulation results show that the Matthew effect leads to an irreversible polarization of individual wealth on the network. Such polarization makes moderate cooperation levels more prevalent, which helps to explain the widespread coexistence of prosocial and antisocial behavior. Meanwhile, heterogeneous networks may restrict the polarization of wealth, but also inhibit the evolution of cooperation, requiring a reconsideration of the commonly held view that heterogeneous networks enhance cooperation.

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Coupling group selection and network reciprocity in social dilemmas through multilayer networks

Shi

Wei

Perc

et al. 2022

Applied Mathematics and Computation

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Effects of dynamic-Win-Stay-Lose-Learn model with voluntary participation in social dilemma

Cited by 10 publications

References 41 publications

Justice strategy can promote cooperation with the joint of dynamic aspiration in social dilemma

Justice strategy can promote cooperation with the joint of dynamic aspiration in social dilemma

Cumulative advantage is a double-edge sword for cooperation

Coupling group selection and network reciprocity in social dilemmas through multilayer networks

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