Effects of Carbon Policy on Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand

Li, Changhong; Wang, Jialuo; Zheng, Jiao; Gao, Jiani

doi:10.3390/su14095548

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Building upon the comparison of the two policies, refs. [23,24] introduced a third policy for comparison. Ref.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ordering Decisions with an Unreliable Supplier under the Carbon Cap-and-Trade System

Ren,

Bian,

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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The global focus on carbon reduction has intensified, prompting numerous high-energy-consuming enterprises to venture into the carbon cap-and-trade system. However, in recent years, the emergence of destabilizing factors has introduced disruptions to supply chains. The study addresses the two-stage ordering problem for a manufacturer under the carbon cap-and-trade system. In the first stage, the manufacturer engages in green investments and places orders with both an unreliable and a reliable supplier. After updating demand forecast information in the second stage, orders are placed with the backup supplier, and carbon allowances are settled at the end of the period. Under these conditions, three supply scenarios of the unreliable supplier are considered: time-varying supply with imperfect demand updates, all-or-nothing supply with imperfect demand updates, and time-varying supply with perfect demand updates. Optimal ordering decisions are provided for each scenario. We find that when demand updates are imperfect, the manufacturer will invariably engage with the unreliable supplier. However, when demand updates are perfect, the manufacturer may choose to forgo the unreliable supplier. Next, we analyze the influence of carbon trading prices on ordering decisions in these scenarios. We find that when the probability of disruption is substantial, dual sourcing must exist in the first stage under the all-or-nothing supply. Finally, we conduct numerical analysis by utilizing parameters, such as carbon trading prices, as referenced in the existing literature. Through numerical analysis, we find that opting for the all-or-nothing supplier becomes economically advantageous for the manufacturer when the backup supplier is profitable. Conversely, when the backup supplier is not profitable, the manufacturer tends to opt for the unreliable supplier with time-varying supply. Moreover, optimal profit for the manufacturer is not achieved when demand updates are perfect.

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“…Building upon the comparison of the two policies, refs. [23,24] introduced a third policy for comparison. Ref.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Meanwhile, ref. [24] compared carbon tax, carbon trading, and government subsidies, noting that carbon tax may reduce supply chain profits.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ordering Decisions with an Unreliable Supplier under the Carbon Cap-and-Trade System

Ren,

Bian,

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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“…He et al [ 25 ] made the optimal decisions of channel members under carbon cap and trade policy through MV approach. Li et al [ 26 ] studied manufacturer-led supply chain with carbon cap and trade by constructing mean-variance utility function, they pointed out that a low degree of risk avoidance will increase firms’ profits. Choi et al [ 27 ] considered risk averse agents and retail competition under MV framework, and showed that the increasing or decreasing the retail selling price depends on the level of competition.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game

Huang,

Liu,

Tao

et al. 2023

PLoS ONE

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With the implementation of the double carbon plan, this paper considers the delivery fees of two risk averse logistics companies under carbon cap and trade mechanism. We establish logistics company Stackelberg (MS) model and retailer Stackelberg (RS) model under mean variance (MV) framework, respectively. We obtain the optimal delivery fees and retail prices. We find out that the higher degree of risk aversion can lead to a lower delivery fee. We also show that a higher carbon trading price or a higher cross price sensitivity will increase delivery fees. Moreover, we indicate that the performances of logistics companies under MS scenario are higher than that RS scenario. In addition, we suggest that under the carbon cap and trade rules, in order to obtain higher profits, logistics companies should use fuel vehicle for transportation under certain conditions, and use electric vehicle in other cases.

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“…Based on the aforementioned theoretical analysis, considering the research conclusions of Fan et al (2016), Song et al (2019), andLi et al (2022), the government and enterprises should follow their own maximizing goals of carbon decision behavior. The government expects to reduce carbon emissions through the increasing costs of enterprises for environmental performance, while enterprises want maximum profits for corporate performance to cut down their total costs through many more production with carbon emissions.…”

Section: Critical Factors Of Carbon Decision Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium analysis of carbon decision behavior for the evolutionary game between the government and enterprises

Ding

2022

Front. Energy Res.

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With the implementation of the carbon-neutral goal, an evolutionary game of carbon decision behavior was derived from the difference between government carbon mitigation and enterprises’ performance growth. This paper constructed a double-performance (DP) objective function of environmental performance and corporate performance. Four carbon decision factors, namely, carbon emission rights, carbon tax, green innovation, and green subsidy, were added separately into the DP model to search for the equilibrium point using the Stackelberg game. The research shows the following: (ⅰ) the price effect of carbon emission rights can restrain excess carbon emission of enterprises to a certain extent; (ⅱ) the reverse effect of a carbon tax can force enterprises to achieve the carbon mitigation goal through green innovation; (ⅲ) the reinforcement effect of green innovation can strengthen the promotion of environmental performance but accelerate the decline of corporate performance; and (ⅳ) the incentive effect of green subsidy can make corporate performance reach the inflection point ahead of time and realize DP synergistic growth. The evolutionary game between the government and enterprises results in the fluctuation change that causes DP to rise first, then decrease, and finally increase. Also, DP can be developed in a synergistic way under collaborative governance for its consistency of carbon decision behavior.

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Effects of Carbon Policy on Carbon Emission Reduction in Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand

Cited by 6 publications

References 46 publications

Ordering Decisions with an Unreliable Supplier under the Carbon Cap-and-Trade System

Ordering Decisions with an Unreliable Supplier under the Carbon Cap-and-Trade System

Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game

Equilibrium analysis of carbon decision behavior for the evolutionary game between the government and enterprises

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