Effects of a dominant retailer on green supply chain activities with government cooperation

Zand, Fatemeh; Yaghoubi, Saeed

doi:10.1007/s10668-021-01498-7

Cited by 12 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 46 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…By exploring the influence of government subsidy coefficients, performance incentive bases, and other factors on the evolution of the two-level green supply chain composed of green suppliers and green manufacturers, their aim to eliminate free-riding behaviors as much as possible, so that enterprises upstream and downstream of the green supply chain can reduce emissions more quickly [28]. F. Zand (2022), considering that there is a government intention to improve the level of green management through the cooperation of manufacturers, adds government factors into the research of the two-level green supply chain model constructed by the manufacturer and retailer to explore government factors. The government factor is added to this study to explore the cooperation between the government and enterprises [29].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…F. Zand (2022), considering that there is a government intention to improve the level of green management through the cooperation of manufacturers, adds government factors into the research of the two-level green supply chain model constructed by the manufacturer and retailer to explore government factors. The government factor is added to this study to explore the cooperation between the government and enterprises [29]. W. Cheng (2022) discussed the effects of government interventions, such as government subsidies and tax policies, on the competition between green supply chains and non-green supply chains [30].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Supply Chain Management Diffusion under Environmental Regulation

Qi,

Guo,

Guan

et al. 2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The continuous deterioration of the ecological environment and the increasing scarcity of resources have posed a serious challenge to the survival and development of human beings, and the implementation of green supply chain management (GSCM) in this context is an effective means to ensure the sustainable development of society and the economy. In order to seek the optimal strategy of evolutionary game in the implementation of green supply chain management and explore the influence of environmental regulation intensity and public preference degree on the evolution process of green supply chain management diffusion development, this paper takes the study of green supply chain management diffusion as the core innovation point, and under the premise of environmental regulation, selects the government, the core enterprise, and the public as the participating bodies of green supply chain management diffusion, and uses the theory of evolutionary game to construct a diffusion model of green supply chain management. Using evolutionary game theory to construct a diffusion model, and with the help of MATLAB and other mathematical tools for numerical simulation analysis, we discuss the diffusion of the green supply chain and derive the optimal combination strategy. The results of the study show that: (1) there are four evolutionary stable states in the process of green supply chain management diffusion: preliminary diffusion, extinction, semi-diffusion, and full diffusion; (2) it will be beneficial for the government to promote the evolutionary diffusion of green supply chain management by implementing a higher intensity of pollution tax policy while implementing green supply chain incentive strategies; (3) the government, while implementing environmental regulation policies, should also pay attention to the guidance of the public’s awareness of environmental friendliness and greenness, and focus on the role of the comprehensive strategy selection of the three parties of the game in reaching the optimal state. The conclusions of the study provide theoretical guidance and decision support for the implementation and diffusion of green supply chain management under environmental regulation.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Supply Chain Management Diffusion under Environmental Regulation

Qi,

Guo,

Guan

et al. 2024

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The results showed that the wholesale price dominated by the manufacturer is higher than that dominated by the retailer. Zand et al [ 8 ] considered a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, constructed game models of cooperation and non-cooperation between the manufacturer and the government when the retailer is a dominant enterprise, and discussed the influence of the dominance of retailers on the level of cooperation between the manufacturers and the government. Xu et al [ 9 ] explored the difference in consumers’ perception of the green level of products in different channels, and constructed game models of manufacturer-dominated, retailer-dominated and equal power between manufacturers and retailers, and found that the equal power structure of manufacturers and retailers can improve the green level of products and the profitability of supply chain.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

R&D mode and coordination of green products in sustainable supply chain considering power structures

Liu,

Feng

2023

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Green product R&D has a significant impact on the sustainable development of the economy and environment, and green product R&D can be carried out by manufacturers, retailers, third-party companies, and enterprise alliances. The decision-making order in the supply chain depends on the power structures, which can affect the choice of the supply chain decision-making. To study the optimal choice of green product R&D mode in different power structures and the influence of power structure on product price, market demand, green level, and enterprise profits, This paper compares five modes including green product R&D by manufacturers, green product R&D by retailers, green product R&D outsourced by manufacturers to third-party companies, green product R&D outsourced by retailers to third-party companies and green product R&D by manufacturers and retailers in the three power structures of manufacturers as core enterprises, retailers as core enterprises, and equal power between manufacturers and retailers to study the selection strategy of green product R&D modes in the sustainable supply chain. The conclusion provides a strategic reference for the selection of green product R&D mode in different power structures. The findings indicate that when manufacturers are core enterprises, retailers’ green product R&D is better than that of manufacturers. When retailers are core enterprises, manufacturers’ green product R&D is better than that of retailers. In the same power structure, manufacturers’ green product R&D is better than outsourcing to third-party companies, retailers’ green product R&D is better than outsourcing to third-party companies, and manufacturers and retailers jointly conduct green product R&D better than manufacturers or retailers alone. When manufacturers and retailers have equal power, the market demand and the product green level are the highest, and the retail price is the lowest. When manufacturers are core enterprises, manufacturers’ profits are the highest. When retailers are core enterprises, retailers’ profits are the highest. Finally, a two-part pricing contract is used to coordinate the optimal selection strategies.

show abstract

“…Based on the existing research on the competition relationship between manufacturers and retailers in the closed-loop supply chain, Yang discussed whether, and how, the retailer's sales effort level affects the economic performance and sustainability of remanufacturing [35]. Zand et al studied the environmental goal decision making of manufacturers and retailers from different power perspectives under the background of the cooperation between the government and the manufacturer [36]. Gu et al studied whether online channels should be added to sell complementary green products in the supply chain dominated by retailers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Retailer-Led Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Considering Sales Effort

Zhang

Ding

2023

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper develops a Stackelberg game model for a retailer-led secondary low-carbon supply chain (L-CSC) comprising a manufacturer and a retailer. Then, a two-part pricing contract is designed to investigate the product pricing, carbon reduction, and sales effort decision problems, and relevant management insights are obtained through numerical analysis. The study shows an efficiency loss in decentralized decision making compared to centralized decision making. Considering the sales effort improves the efficiency of the supply chain, retail price, carbon emission reduction (CER), sales effort level, and supply chain profit positively relate to product low carbon preference and sales sensitivity coefficients. The designed two-part pricing contract can increase the profit of the entire L-CSC and optimize the decision level under centralized decision making.

show abstract

Effects of a dominant retailer on green supply chain activities with government cooperation

Cited by 12 publications

References 46 publications

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Supply Chain Management Diffusion under Environmental Regulation

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Supply Chain Management Diffusion under Environmental Regulation

R&D mode and coordination of green products in sustainable supply chain considering power structures

Retailer-Led Low-Carbon Supply Chain Coordination Considering Sales Effort

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About