Abstract:What limits should there be on the areas of life that are governed by market forces? For many years, no one seriously defended the buying and selling votes for political elections. In recent years, however, this situation has changed, with a number of authors defending the permissibility of vote markets (e.g. Freiman 2014). One popular objection to such markets is that they would lead to a tyranny of wealth, where the poor are politically dominated by the rich. In a recent paper, Taylor (Res Publica 23(3):313-… Show more
“…The equality argument against voting markets takes many forms. 3 The most recent and articulate form is the 'tyranny of wealth argument' (Taylor 2017b;Archer et al 2019). According to this argument a market in voting enables wealthier individuals to gain political influence at the expense of poorer individuals (Taylor 2017b: 314).…”
Section: Objection 1: the Equality Argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Two of the most common objections to the use of market mechanisms in voting are the equality objection and the inalienability objection. According to the first objection, the poor become more politically disadvantaged when vote trading is permitted (Archer et al 2019). The second objection asserts that there is something intrinsically or functionally problematic with the action of selling one’s vote (Radin 1987; Maloberti 2019).…”
Section: Introduction – Market Mechanisms In Votingmentioning
The philosophical debate concerning political exchange has largely been confined to debating the desirability of vote trading; where individuals can sell their votes or buy votes from others. However, I show that the vote credit systems prevalent in public choice theory entirely avoid the common objections to political exchange that afflict vote trading proposals. Namely, vote credit systems avoid equality concerns and inalienability concerns. I offer an alternative critique to formal mechanisms that encourage political exchange by drawing on the role that impartiality and impartial moral judgements play in democratic and electoral institutions.
“…The equality argument against voting markets takes many forms. 3 The most recent and articulate form is the 'tyranny of wealth argument' (Taylor 2017b;Archer et al 2019). According to this argument a market in voting enables wealthier individuals to gain political influence at the expense of poorer individuals (Taylor 2017b: 314).…”
Section: Objection 1: the Equality Argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Two of the most common objections to the use of market mechanisms in voting are the equality objection and the inalienability objection. According to the first objection, the poor become more politically disadvantaged when vote trading is permitted (Archer et al 2019). The second objection asserts that there is something intrinsically or functionally problematic with the action of selling one’s vote (Radin 1987; Maloberti 2019).…”
Section: Introduction – Market Mechanisms In Votingmentioning
The philosophical debate concerning political exchange has largely been confined to debating the desirability of vote trading; where individuals can sell their votes or buy votes from others. However, I show that the vote credit systems prevalent in public choice theory entirely avoid the common objections to political exchange that afflict vote trading proposals. Namely, vote credit systems avoid equality concerns and inalienability concerns. I offer an alternative critique to formal mechanisms that encourage political exchange by drawing on the role that impartiality and impartial moral judgements play in democratic and electoral institutions.
“… 19. Regulatory measures designed to mitigate wealth effects might, however, also mitigate the potential benefits of markets in votes. On this point, see Archer et al (2017). …”
mentioning
confidence: 98%
“… 6. An exception is the objection that sees the problem in the government being more likely to pursue policies that are distributively unjust. See, for example, Anderson and Tollision (1990) and Archer et al (2017). …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Taylor (2016c) advances a specific regulatory remedy to address the concern that standard measures would be ineffective in preventing that the party favored by the poor would have to pay higher prices to attract rich voters. For assessments of Freiman’s and Taylor’s claims, see Archer and Wilson (2014) and Archer et al (2017).…”
Standard rationales for the illegality of markets in votes are based on concerns over the undue influence of wealth and the erosion of civic responsibility that would result from the commodification of votes. I present an alternative rationale based on how the mere alienability of votes alters the strategic setting faced by political actors. The inalienability of votes ensure the strict secrecy of voting, that is, the inability of voters to communicate credibly to others the content of their votes. In doing so, it diminishes the credibility of all political actors’ clientelistic promises to reciprocate. By drastically reducing the transaction costs of vote exchanges, the legality of markets in votes would thus exacerbate the detrimental effects of political clientelism on the quality of democratic governments.
This paper expounds and defends a relational egalitarian account of the moral wrongfulness of vote markets according to which such markets are incompatible with our relating to one another as equals qua people with views on what we should collectively decide. Two features of this account are especially interesting. First, it shows why vote markets are objectionable even in cases where standard objections to them, such as the complaint that they result in inequality in opportunity for political influence across rich and poor people, are inapplicable. Second, it specifies the sense in which, politically speaking, we should relate as equals, and in doing provides a richer version of recent relational egalitarian accounts of the ideal of democracy.
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