Effective property rights, conflict and growth

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of the interaction between appropriative conflict and economic growth. Appropriative conflict, as measured by the diversion of resources, is viewed as the cost of securing effective property rights. We identify conditions under which conflict rises or falls as the rate of economic growth improves. The main implication of the analysis is that if the quality of property rights is sufficiently poor then faster economic growth stimulates the allocation of resources to appropriative activities and might result in decreased social welfare.

On the Timing of Political Regime Changes: Theory and Application to the Arab Spring

“…So, we resort to the condition that the elite's consumption is always higher than the citizens' consumption under permanent dictatorship. From (17), a sucient 31 Comparing this expression with the one in (17), with r E = 0, it turns out that the growth rate of consumption is similar. The striking dierence is the existence of a scale eect.…”

“…The authors outline that rebellion and conicts may be explained by severe grievances, such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society. Several authors (see in particular Torvik, 2002, Hodler, 2006, Mehlum et al, 2006, and Gonzalez, 2007 have also pointed out that resource abundance induces political instability if competing factions try to obtain control over the associated rents. Resources cause rent seeking and ghting activities between rival groups, which weaken property rights and lead to a curse.…”

“…The answer to this question is not trivial in general and depends on the particular criterion one has in mind to evaluate the best outcome. At rst glance, one may reply that the best strategy is the one 17 The following reasoning can easily be extended to the other possible cases. 18 Under this condition, the value of the elite is monotonically increasing in u E in a permanent autocratic regime with a policy mix.…”

Introduction to development theory

“…The contribution by González [16] displays a similar reticence to give property rights an unambiguous green signal. But it is particularly distinctive in that it places the discussion on exactly the same turf that efficiency-minded economists like to stand on: investment, growth and Pareto efficiency rather than equity.…”

“…I now turn to the remaining two papers in this issue, those by González [16] and Anderson [1]. One of the most crucial concerns in developing countries is the security of property rights, and what that implies for investment and growth (see Ray [31] for a quick discussion of the main issues, and references).…”