Effective incomplete contracts and milestones in market-distant R&amp;D collaboration

Kloyer, Martin; Scholderer, Joachim

doi:10.1016/j.respol.2011.11.003

Cited by 44 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 61 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Although information asymmetries are a natural side effect of outsourcing relationships, they can however exacerbate the opportunism problem and curtail relationship effectiveness. Because monitoring involves several difficulties in R&D supply relationships (Kloyer & Scholderer, ), it may not be a reliable tool for overcoming information asymmetries. In addition to calling for supplier firms to take a long‐term perspective and engage in self‐control, harmonizing both parties' interests can diminish concerns of moral hazard by sharing in the innovation return.…”

Section: Discussion Managerial Implications and Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although these adaptations are necessary, they also provide latitude both to behave opportunistically and to renegotiate to their own advantage (Anderson & Narus, ), that is, to hold up (e.g., Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, ). In our case, it is the R&D buyer who could attempt to hold down the supplier firm's remuneration (Tirole, ); however, supplier firms anticipating buyer holdup can themselves become motivated to behave unethically (Kloyer, ; Kloyer & Scholderer, ). To compensate for potential losses due to anticipated holdup, the supplier firm could be motivated to withhold information or efforts intentionally.…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, practice‐oriented theorists are not satisfied either. Much empirical attention has been devoted to the incentives or instruments that deter or at least decrease partner misbehavior (for an overview, see,e.g., Brown, Dev, & Lee, ; Cavusgil, Deligonul, & Zhang, ; Helm & Kloyer, ; Jap & Anderson, ; Vázquez, Iglesias, & Rodríguez‐del‐Bosque, ; Wathne & Heide, ; regarding opportunism in R&D cooperation,e.g., Kloyer & Scholderer, ). However, only a modest number of empirical studies shed light on the potential determinants of opportunism (Das, ; Hawkins, Wittmann, & Beyerlein, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Determinants of moral hazard in research and development supply relations: Empirical results beyond the agency‐theory explanation

2018

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Moral hazard can hinder both the realization and the effectiveness of research and development (R&D) supply relations. However, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies investigating the determinants of moral hazard under the specific circumstances of R&D supply relations. Based on a study on 104 cases, this article will help to fill that gap. The results not only confirm information asymmetries as determinants, as predicted by principal‐agent theory, but also reveal surprising effects of additional factors. Thus, we show that the general explanation of moral hazard needs to be adapted to the specifics of a concrete exchange situation.

show abstract

Section: Discussion Managerial Implications and Limitationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Determinants of moral hazard in research and development supply relations: Empirical results beyond the agency‐theory explanation

2018

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It leads to the insufficient sharing of tacit knowledge in R&D outsourcing. However, a lot of tacit knowledge is the key for employers to make technological breakthrough (Martínez-Noya & García-Canal, 2011;Kloyer & Scholderer, 2012). Therefore, how to design an effective contract to share the tacit knowledge whose value is unverified and to acquire explicit knowledge is an issue that must be considered when the buyer formulates the R&D outsourcing contracts (Quinn & Strategy, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

R&D outsourcing contract for the unverified value of tacit knowledge sharing

Song

Liu

Ding

et al. 2015

JIEM

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to provide a R&D outsourcing contract design framework to incent R&D outsourcing service providers sharing tacit knowledge.Design/methodology/approach: The author uses the principal-agent theory to builds multitask principal-agent model which focuses on two cases. One case is that the effort costs of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing are complementary, while another is the effort costs are substitutable.Findings: When the costs of explicit and tacit knowledge sharing are complementary, the buyer can increase the incentive coefficient of explicit knowledge sharing to stimulate tacit knowledge sharing. This motive method not only stimulates tacit knowledge sharing, but also will further stimulate the effort levels of explicit knowledge sharing. Moreover, the multitask R&D outsourcing contract can motivate the effort of explicit knowledge sharing to achieve system optimization, but it fails to motivate the effort of tacit knowledge sharing to achieve system optimization. Research limitations/implications:In this paper we only consider that the outsourcing relationship is short-term, so the multitask R&D outsourcing contract is formal. In fact, the outsourcing relationship may be long-term, and the multitask R&D outsourcing contract will be informal.-1349-Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management -http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1497Practical implications: Our study provides a theoretical model for formulating an effective R&D outsourcing contract and promoting the transfer of tacit knowledge sharing.Originality/value: The paper extends prior literature by designing multitask R&D outsourcing contract in order to share the tacit knowledge. We not only consider the cost of substitution relationship between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge, but also consider the cost of complementary relationship.

show abstract

“… Kloyer () and Kloyer and Scholderer () examine the problem arising from adverse selection and moral hazard in the context of vertical R&D collaborations. Specifically, they look at the contractual mechanisms that can mitigate opportunism when R&D results are ‘distant’ from specific market applications.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Vertical Integration, Organizational Governance, and Firm Performance: Evidence from Italian Business Groups

Cainelli

Iacobucci

2014

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Assuming transaction cost economics as a normative tool, we investigate the relationship between firms' 'observed' vertical integration choices and their economic performance. We use a two-stage methodology: in the first, a measure of governance misalignment is computed as a difference between the governance form (i.e., ownership or outsourcing) predicted by transaction cost economics and the form actually observed; the second stage consists of estimating a performance equation where the misalignment variable is introduced together with a set of independent variables. Compared with previous studies, we introduce two novelties: we use the business group as the unit of analysis to detect the ownership of vertically related productions; we assess the moderating role of geographic agglomeration in reducing the need of vertical integration. Our results confirm the importance of technology and price uncertainty in influencing vertical integration; moreover, the misalignment variable is significant in the case of profitability, but not in the case of growth. Copyright

show abstract

Effective incomplete contracts and milestones in market-distant R&D collaboration

Cited by 44 publications

References 61 publications

Determinants of moral hazard in research and development supply relations: Empirical results beyond the agency‐theory explanation

Determinants of moral hazard in research and development supply relations: Empirical results beyond the agency‐theory explanation

R&D outsourcing contract for the unverified value of tacit knowledge sharing

Vertical Integration, Organizational Governance, and Firm Performance: Evidence from Italian Business Groups

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About