2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1997849
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Effective Development Aid: Selectivity, Proliferation and Fragmentation, and the Growth Impact of Development Assistance

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…In future, donors would not need to claim that a poor judgement of their performance was a `certain value judgement’; it could merely point to a competing measure that praised their performance. Indeed, Kihara (, p. 3–4) recently defended Japanese aid using such an argument: ‘some empirical studies, including studies presented here, seem to contradict the findings of the CGD. A number of recent studies have ranked aid donors by various indicators of their aid‐giving and in some of these Japanese aid has been ranked toward the upper end of donor countries’.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…In future, donors would not need to claim that a poor judgement of their performance was a `certain value judgement’; it could merely point to a competing measure that praised their performance. Indeed, Kihara (, p. 3–4) recently defended Japanese aid using such an argument: ‘some empirical studies, including studies presented here, seem to contradict the findings of the CGD. A number of recent studies have ranked aid donors by various indicators of their aid‐giving and in some of these Japanese aid has been ranked toward the upper end of donor countries’.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…Knack and Rahman (2007) regress the 2001 Bureaucratic Quality ratings of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to explanatory variables such as the project aid fragmentation, the ODA/GDP ratio, population growth, per capita GDP growth, and the share of aid from international organizations and "like-minded" groups to demonstrate that project aid fragmentation has a negative and significant influence on bureaucratic quality. However, Kihara (2012) points out that Knack and Rahman's study (2007) is just a "point" estimate for the 2001 rating. To assess the long-term effect of aid fragmentation, Kihara (2012) uses the Government Effectiveness Index in "Aggregate Governance Indicators" (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008) which offers panel data for 85 countries.…”
Section: Literature Review and Research Questionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, Kihara (2012) points out that Knack and Rahman's study (2007) is just a "point" estimate for the 2001 rating. To assess the long-term effect of aid fragmentation, Kihara (2012) uses the Government Effectiveness Index in "Aggregate Governance Indicators" (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2008) which offers panel data for 85 countries. His explanatory variables include the index of project aid fragmentation (the inverse of Herfindahl-Hirschman index), the index of donor proliferation (Theil Index for total ODA), ODA/GNI ratio, GNI per capita, GDP growth rate, population size, multilateral and bilateral aid, and a dummy variable indicating civil wars.…”
Section: Literature Review and Research Questionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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