Effective but inefficient: understanding the costs of counterterrorism

Abstract

This article analyses state counterterrorism (CT) policy on two dimensions: its effectiveness and its efficiency. It points out that CT is likely to be effective but inefficient. The material weakness of terrorist groups in relation to their state opponents, and different organisational dilemmas, increases the probability of an effective CT policy. However, states frequently overreact to terrorist attacks, which are valued in normative instead of strategic terms. Hence, they spend more resources on CT than justified by the threat posed by the terrorist groups. The article concludes that CT should be framed as an allocation of scarce resources that could be used in other important contexts.

Intelligence and radicalization in French prisons: Sociological analysis bottom-up

“…The objective here is not to measure the objective quality of the information extracted and compiled, in other words the effectiveness and efficiency (Chowdhury and Fitzsimmons, 2013) of this contribution to counter-terrorism. Rather, our aim is to understand the nature of the knowledge produced: what types of information are generated through the involvement of all the prison staff in identifying and measuring threats with respect to radicalization and terrorism?…”

The Muslim Question in Europe

“…To cite one example that sparked public outrage and mass demonstrations, London police raided two homes at the Forest Gate apartment complex on 2 June 2006, arrested two Muslims, one of whom was shot, and yet failed to fi nd any evidence of their complicity in a terrorist plot involving chemical explosives. Other critics contend that the resources devoted to hard-power counter-terrorism measures are not only vastly disproportionate to a deliberately exaggerated threat, but also ineffi ciently and ineff ectively deployed by overzealous and poorly informed security agents (Chowdhury and Fitzsimmons 2013;Bossong 2013: 5-6;Bonino 2012: 9;Croft and Moore 2010: 834;Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). In 2012, for example, 3 percent of failed, foiled, or completed terrorist attacks in Europe were religiously motivated compared to 76 percent planned by separatists (Europol 2013).…”

An Exploration of the EU's Counterterrorism Measures: Can the EU Learn From Its Member States? A Case Study Examining Italy

“…Punishment is still an important component to reintegrative shaming because it is required to uphold the moral code of society, but this strategy does recognize the importance of drawing the terrorist back into society. 29 Based on John…”

“…Additionally, Ginges highlights an important message in his research, stating that "it is only possible to determine policy once we comprehend the nature of the [terrorist] phenomena that we are 28 Chapter III will further examine the factors that drive individuals to take part in and support terrorist organizations. 29 Ginges, 1997, 175. 30 John Braithwaite's theory of shaming explains the effects of shaming on criminals by breaking down the theory into three components.…”