Effect of reciprocity mechanisms on evolutionary dynamics in feedback-evolving games

Ma, Xiaojian; Quan, Ji; Wang, Xianjia

doi:10.1007/s11071-023-09052-y

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Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…While the theory of reciprocal altruism offers a robust mechanism for explaining cooperative behaviors [25][26][27], it heavily relies on repeated interactions between two individuals. In real-world situations, not all human interactions anticipate subsequent encounters.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An evolutionary trust game model with group reputation within the asymmetric population

Zhou,

Zhu,

Zhao

et al. 2024

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An evolutionary trust game model with group reputation within the asymmetric population

Zhou,

Zhu,

Zhao

et al. 2024

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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Intervention analysis for fake news diffusion: an evolutionary game theory perspective

Liu,

Song,

2024

Nonlinear Dyn

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Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Environmental Feedback in a Network with Two Communities

Betz,

Fu,

Masuda

2024

Bull Math Biol

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Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying population dynamics in various manners. We propose and analyze an eco-evolutionary game dynamics model on a network with two communities such that players interact with other players in the same community and those in the opposite community at different rates. In our model, we consider two-person matrix games with pairwise interactions occurring on individual edges and assume that the environmental state depends on edges rather than on nodes or being globally shared in the population. We analytically determine the equilibria and their stability under a symmetric population structure assumption, and we also numerically study the replicator dynamics of the general model. The model shows rich dynamical behavior, such as multiple transcritical bifurcations, multistability, and anti-synchronous oscillations. Our work offers insights into understanding how the presence of community structure impacts the eco-evolutionary dynamics within and between niches.

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Effect of reciprocity mechanisms on evolutionary dynamics in feedback-evolving games

Cited by 4 publications

References 61 publications

An evolutionary trust game model with group reputation within the asymmetric population

An evolutionary trust game model with group reputation within the asymmetric population

Intervention analysis for fake news diffusion: an evolutionary game theory perspective

Evolutionary Game Dynamics with Environmental Feedback in a Network with Two Communities

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