Effect of asymmetry in payoff on behavior in a two-person non-zero-sum game

Bixenstine, V. Edwin; Chambers, Norman S.; Wilson, Kellogg V.

doi:10.1177/002200276400800206

Cited by 50 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…These results are contrary to those obtained in some unmodified PDG studies (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965;Bixenstine, Chambers & Wilson, 1964;Oskamp & Perlman, 1965) in which females were less cooperative. These results are contrary to those obtained in some unmodified PDG studies (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965;Bixenstine, Chambers & Wilson, 1964;Oskamp & Perlman, 1965) in which females were less cooperative.…”

Section: Penalty Options Used In Defiance Conditionscontrasting

confidence: 99%

Threateners' reactions to prior announcement of behavioral compliance or defiance

1970

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Fifty subjects, 25 males and 25 females, played a Prisoner's Dilemma game which was modified to permit them to send threats to a simulated player which stated that the latter would be penalized if he did not cooperate on the next trial. The simulated target employed one of four patterns of responding to the threat: open defiance, in which the target both verbally and behaviorally defied the threats; concealed defiance, in which the target either refused to reveal his intentions or lied to the source, but was behaviorally defiant; and open and concealed compliance conditions similarly defined. The results indicated that prior announcement of intentions by the target deterred the source from using the threat in the open defiance condition and “converted” him to a mutual cooperator in the open compliance condition. The concealed conditions, however, encouraged exploitative play by the subjects; this finding was interpreted by a cost analysis. It was concluded that the findings supported Osgood's Grit proposal.

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Section: Penalty Options Used In Defiance Conditionscontrasting

confidence: 99%

Threateners' reactions to prior announcement of behavioral compliance or defiance

1970

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“…Bartos, 1967;Benton, 1971;Black & Higbee, 1973;Marwell, Ratcliff, & Schmitt, 1969;Swingle, 1970); and (f) cooperativeness of the other (cf. Bixenstine, Chambers, & Wilson, 1964;Bixenstine & Wilson, 1963;Kahn et al, 1971;Komorita, 1965).…”

Section: An Illustration Of the Application Oflo To The Bargaining Li...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Measurement of interpersonal orientation.

Swap

Rubin²

1983

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

134

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“…Experiments employing the Prisoner's Dilemma game have been conducted by several investigators (Bixenstine, Chambers, and Wilson, 1964;Bixenstine, Potash, and Wilson, 1963;Bixenstine and Wilson, 1963;Deutsch, 1955;Lave, 1965;Lutzker, 1960;McClintock, Harrison, Strand, and Gallo, 1963;Minas, Scodel, Marlowe, and Rawson, 1960;Scodel, & h a s , Ratoosh, and Lipetz, 1959). Most of these studies paid attention to many types of independent variables (Gallo and McClintock, 1965) but suffered from a narrow range of dependent variables and a nonrigorous way of treating them.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental studies of stochastic models for the Prisoner's dilemma

Rapoport¹,

Mowshowitz²

1966

Syst. Res.

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A game of strategy represents a situation in which two or more players make choices between available alternatives. When the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, it is a nonzero‐sum game. The psychologically interesting aspects of this game or of any realistic situation which can be adequately described by it stem from mixed motives, in which the confrontation is not only between the conflicting players but also between the conflicting motives within each player.

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Effect of asymmetry in payoff on behavior in a two-person non-zero-sum game

Cited by 50 publications

References 4 publications

Threateners' reactions to prior announcement of behavioral compliance or defiance

Threateners' reactions to prior announcement of behavioral compliance or defiance

Measurement of interpersonal orientation.

Experimental studies of stochastic models for the Prisoner's dilemma

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