Education policy and inequality: A political economy approach

Gioacchino, Debora Di; Sabani, Laura

doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.06.002

Cited by 23 publications

(12 citation statements)

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“…Several authors have followed a political economy approach to study how the public funding of higher education may be the result of the political process. Important examples are Creedy and François (), Fernández and Rogerson (), and, more recently, Zhang () and Gioacchino and Sabani (). Here, instead, I follow the approach of Glomm and Ravikumar (); I take policy as given and look at its implications.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public funding of higher education: Who gains, who loses?

Reis

2018

Int J of Economic Theory

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This paper analyses the effects of public funding of higher education on individuals' welfare, taking into account the hierarchical nature of the education system and the fact that parents may complement basic public education with private tutoring. Although public funding financed by a proportional income tax increases access to higher education, some of the agents who gain access lose in welfare terms. Moreover, it is shown that the marginal agent regarding access to higher education would always prefer a pure private funding system in which he would not send his offspring to higher education but would also not pay tuition fees or pay taxes.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public funding of higher education: Who gains, who loses?

Reis

2018

Int J of Economic Theory

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“…Dessa forma, a educação produz um efeito que influencia outros efeitos em toda a economia por meio de uma série de externalidades, sendo importante ressaltar que a alocação dos gastos públicos em educação pode ser responsável pela desigualdade social, caso estes recursos sejam alocados de forma desproporcional. (BARROS; MENDONÇA, 1997;GIOACCHINO;SABANI, 2009 …”

Section: Introductionunclassified

A avaliação da educação superior: um estudo sobre os determinantes de desempenho

Lepchak¹,

Oliveira²,

Fragalli³

et al. 2016

RIAEE

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“…It contributes to the political economy of education by investigating the possibility that education policy responds to the interest of firms exerting pressure on the policy-makers in order to obtain their favorite human-capital composition. The political economy approach has mainly focused on the redistributive role of education and on income distribution as the main determinant of educational policy (see Di Gioacchino and Sabani, 2009). In this paper, we abstract away from education's redistributive role and focus on its effect on the "production" of skills.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following Krueger and Kumar (2004a and 2004b), we consider a continuum of two-period lived agents with total mass one who differ in their innate talent  ∈ [0 1], which is 10 The same variables also determine relative profits in the two sectors. 11 Having exogenous prices, is a clear, although in our context innocuous, simplification.…”

Section: Individualsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying for Education in a Two‐Sector Model

Gioacchino

Profeta

2013

Economics & Politics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Lobbying for Education in a Two-sector Model Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn a two-period model, firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the social planner. However, if lobbying is costly, only one sector finds it profitable to offer monetary contribution and direct resources towards the type of education required by its production. Which sector will engage in lobbying depends on relative size, productivity and price in the two sectors.JEL-Code: I200, D720. Debora Di Gioacchino April 2011We thank Maurizio Franzini, Vincenzo Galasso, Francesco Vona and Brunero Liseo for useful comments. We thank Elena Pisano for excellent research assistance.

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Education policy and inequality: A political economy approach

Cited by 23 publications

References 20 publications

Public funding of higher education: Who gains, who loses?

Public funding of higher education: Who gains, who loses?

A avaliação da educação superior: um estudo sobre os determinantes de desempenho

Lobbying for Education in a Two‐Sector Model

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