Educating for Autonomy: Liberalism and Autonomy in the Capabilities Approach

Ferracioli, Luara; Terlazzo, Rosa

doi:10.1007/s10677-013-9443-2

Cited by 22 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In fact, several philosophers have argued that Nussbaum's capabilities theory is not politically liberal despite her claims to the contrary (e.g. Barclay 2003;Ferracioli and Terlazzo 2014). One reason that we should be worried about whether Nussbaum's capability theory really is politically liberal should be briefly mentioned.…”

Section: Should Capabilitarian Theories Of Justice Be Politically Liberal?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Capabilitarianism

Robeyns

2016

Journal of Human Development and Capabilities

164

116

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This paper offers a critique of Martha Nussbaum's description of the capability approach, and offers an alternative. I will argue that Nussbaum's characterization of the capability approach is flawed, in two ways. First, she unduly limits the capability to two strands of work, thereby ignoring important other capabilitarian scholarship. Second, she argues that there are five essential elements that all capability theories meet; yet upon closer analysis three of them are not really essential to the capability approach. I also offer an alternative description of the capability approach, which is called the cartwheel view of the capability approach. This view is at the same time radically multidisciplinary yet also contains a foundationally robust core among its various usages, and is therefore much better able to make the case that the capability approach can be developed in a very wide range of more specific normative theories. Finally, the carthwheel view is used to argue against Nussbaum's claim that all capabiliarian political theory needs to be politically liberal.

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Section: Should Capabilitarian Theories Of Justice Be Politically Liberal?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Capabilitarianism

Robeyns

2016

Journal of Human Development and Capabilities

164

116

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“…Hence her choice of the 7 Autonomy education could be viewed as part of capability education. Or capabilities could be understood as conditions for autonomy (Mackenzie, 2014), or comprehensive autonomy as a condition for the development and exercise of capabilities (Ferracioli and Terlazzo, 2014). But a rich account of autonomy and of its conditions could also compete and conflict with the capability aim for education.…”

Section: The Cultural Imperialism Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Autonomy Education Beyond Borders

Zwarthoed¹

2020

GJN

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This article examines whether autonomy as an educational aim should be defended at the global scale. It begins by identifying the normative issues at stake in global autonomy education by distinguishing them from the problems of autonomy education in multicultural nation-states. The article then explains why a planet-wide expansion of the ideal of autonomy is conceivable on the condition that the concept of autonomy is widened in a way that renders its precise meaning flexibly adjustable to a variety of distinct social and cultural contexts. A context-transcendent, core meaning of autonomy remains in place, however, according to which a person is only autonomous if she relates to the values and goals that direct her life in a way so that she sees them as her own and is able to identify and critically assess her principal reasons for action. Finally, the article addresses two challenges to the global expansion of autonomy education: the objection that autonomy is presently not the most important educational aim and the objection that global autonomy education is a form of cultural imperialism. It finds both objections wanting.

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“…But in order to avoid perfectionism and the controversies that are often associated with it, we should add that the value of autonomy is purely instrumental . If we believe in the rational capacity of each person to know what is best for her, we should concede that a sufficient degree of autonomy plays an important instrumental role in making our lives less likely to go badly in general (Ferracioli and Terlazzo ). So although it is important to recognize that some persons genuinely lack the interest in pursuing a life of autonomous assertion due to metaphysical beliefs they wholeheartedly endorse, it is still true that every person has an interest in avoiding the pernicious effects of ethical servility .…”

Section: Autonomy In the State Of Naturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…But above all, it matters whether she sees herself in a certain way : as morally entitled to stay in the village or move to the city, become a local teacher or a university professor, walk naked in her tribe or wear clothes in the city. That is, it matters whether she sees herself as morally entitled to make her own decisions in life, or whether she feels compelled to have her life dictated by those around her, as it were (Ferracioli and Terlazzo ; see also Govier ; Benson ).…”

Section: Autonomy In the State Of Naturementioning

confidence: 99%

The Anarchist's Myth: Autonomy, Children, and State Legitimacy

Ferracioli¹

2015

Hypatia

Self Cite

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Philosophical anarchists have made their living criticizing theories of state legitimacy and the duty to obey the law. The most prominent theories of state legitimacy have been called into doubt by the anarchists' insistence that citizens' lack of consent to the state renders the whole justificatory enterprise futile. Autonomy requires consent, they argue, and justification must respect autonomy. In this essay, I want to call into question the weight of consent in protecting our capacity for autonomy. I argue that if we care about all of the preconditions for autonomy, then we have good reasons to leave the state of nature. This leaves the philosophical anarchist with a dilemma. If she truly cares about autonomy, then she must welcome the state. But if she wants to deny the legitimacy of the state because of the value of consent, then she needs to downplay the moral significance of autonomy in people's lives. If autonomy matters, the state does too. If it doesn't, then consent doesn't. The philosophical anarchist can't have it both ways.

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Educating for Autonomy: Liberalism and Autonomy in the Capabilities Approach

Cited by 22 publications

References 18 publications

Capabilitarianism

Capabilitarianism

Autonomy Education Beyond Borders

The Anarchist's Myth: Autonomy, Children, and State Legitimacy

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