Ecumenical alethic pluralism

Ferrari, Filippo; Moruzzi, Sebastiano

doi:10.1080/00455091.2018.1493880

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 28 publications

(23 reference statements)

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“…In proposing to extend the alethic pluralism of Truth and Objectivity to embrace a deflated truth property, and to canvass a home for this property in discourse of basic taste, I pursue a suggestion in parallel to that ofFerrari and Moruzzi (2019). They and I both need, however, to defang the Inflationary Argument of chapter 1 of Truth and Objectivity.…”

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confidence: 99%

Alethic pluralism, deflationism, and faultless disagreement

Wright

2021

Metaphilosophy

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One of the most important “folk” anti‐realist thoughts about certain areas of our thought and discourse—basic taste, for instance, or comedy—is that their lack of objectivity crystallises in the possibility of “faultless disagreements”: situations where one party accepts P, another rejects P, and neither is guilty of any kind of mistake of substance or shortcoming of cognitive process. On close inspection, however, it proves challenging to make coherent sense of this idea, and a majority of theorists have come to reject it as incoherent. There are two significant exceptions in the contemporary literature: relativists often hold it up as something of a coup for their view that it can make straightforward sense of faultless disagreement; and the author of this paper has argued (Wright 2006) that making judicious intuitionistic revisions to classical logic can provide resources that suffice to stabilise the notion. The present paper argues that neither relativism nor intuitionism in fact provides a satisfactory account and indicates how an alethic pluralist framework enables us to do better.

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confidence: 99%

Alethic pluralism, deflationism, and faultless disagreement

Wright

2021

Metaphilosophy

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“…If truth is normative for some but not all domains of discourse, it follows that there are at least two truth properties: a normative one and a nonnormative property. In this respect, my kind of pluralism would be very similar to the "ecumenical alethic pluralism" of Ferrari and Moruzzi (2019). Ferrari and Moruzzi use their proposal of a subjectivist and relativist metaphysics and epistemology for the domain of taste, as mentioned above, to argue that the normativity of truth is locally deflated, and that there must thus be a normatively deflated truth property in addition to one or more normative truth properties.…”

Section: Is It Pluralism?mentioning

confidence: 94%

Truth and its uses: deflationism and alethic pluralism

Kaspers

2023

Synthese

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Deflationists believe that the question “What is truth?” should be answered not by means of a metaphysical inquiry into the nature of truth, but by figuring out what use we make of the concept of truth, and the word ‘true’, in practice. This article accepts this methodology, and it thereby rejects pluralism about truth that is driven by ontological considerations. However, it shows that there are practical considerations for a pluralism about truth, formulated at the level of use. The theory expounded by this article states that truth is a dual-purpose tool; it can be used as a device for transferring justificatory burdens and, for select areas of discourse, it can also be used as a standard, a norm. This contrast in how truth is used introduces a bifurcation in our discourse that is reminiscent of metaphysical divides traced by more traditional versions of alethic pluralism. However, my pluralism “at the level of use” states that truth is plural solely at the level of use. It is unified at both the conceptual as well as the metaphysical level. At those levels, the theory takes its cue from deflationism. As such, this theory is offered as a midway point and as a potential way forward in the debate between deflationism and pluralism.

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“…InFerrari and Moruzzi (2018) we also consider the case of defeaters (both undermining and overriding) in order to show that they do not break the normative alignment between truth and justification.…”

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confidence: 99%