Economics of the Sacramental Bread Ordeal in the Russian Princedoms Period

Abstract

The paper analyses the economics behind the ordeal by sacramental bread — a method of criminal dispute resolution in the Russian Princedoms period. Contributing to the framework advanced by Leeson (2011, 2012a, 2012b) [Trial by battle. Journal of Legal Analysis, 3(1), 341–375; An Austrian approach to law and economics, with special reference to superstition. The Review of Austrian Economics, 25(3), 185–198; Ordeals. The Journal of Law and Economics, 55(3), 691–714], this paper advances a hypothesis that the ordeal could have been designed as a ‘pressure valve’ to reduce scepticism in relation to other ordeals. To prove this, a model is constructed showing that when high scepticism causes fixed-outcome ordeals to become costly, the clergy could resort to creating an ordeal, the verdicts of which would not be argued against through a careful manipulation of its costs and benefits. In this ordeal, guilt was determined by the proband’s inability to swallow the bread due to stress and thus relied on a biological reaction instead of a predetermined outcome. Investigations showed that even if the ordeal delivered false verdicts, appealing the verdict was not beneficial to the proband. This was achieved by only employing the ordeal in resolution of petty theft, which made the potential losses from a false verdict very minimal. Further, the ordeal was staged as a confession, which reduced the possibility of a proband facing social ostracism.