Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies

Handke, Christian; Towse, Ruth

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1159085

Cited by 22 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Streaming does not easily fit with the traditional blanket licence business model of the CMOs in the music industry, whereby the CMO negotiates fees and arranges licencing with a host of varied users from broadcasters to hairdressers then distributes the revenues to its members at the same rate according to the quantitative use made of their work (Handke and Towse, 2007). For uses such as TV and radio, for example, CMOs have blanket licence contracts and standardised rates with TV and radio stations; in the United Kingdom, in fact, the BBC continues to work that way with the PRS (Performing Right Society) and PPL (Phonographic Performance Ltd) for digital usage.…”

Section: Streaming and The Cmosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dealing with digital: the economic organisation of streamed music

Towse

2020

Media, Culture & Society

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The intervention of digital service providers (DSPs) or platforms, such as Spotify Apple Music and Tidal, that supply streamed music has fundamentally altered the operation of copyright management organisations (CMOs) and the way song-writers and recording artists are paid. Platform economics has emerged from the economic analysis of two- and multi-sided markets, offering new insights into the way business is conducted in the digital sphere and is applied here to music streaming services. The business model for music streaming differs from previous arrangements by which the royalty paid to song-writers and performers was a percentage of sales. In the case of streamed music, payment is based on revenues from both subscriptions and ad-based free services. The DSP agrees a rate per stream with the various rights holders that varies according to the deal made with each of the major record labels, with CMOs, with representatives of independent labels and with unsigned artists and song-writers with consequences for artists’ earnings. The article discusses these various strands with a view to understanding royalty payments for streamed music in terms of platform economics, offering some data and information from the Norwegian music industry to give empirical support to the analysis.

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Section: Streaming and The Cmosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dealing with digital: the economic organisation of streamed music

Towse

2020

Media, Culture & Society

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“…The economics of CMO are discussed in Besen and Kirby (1989), Besen et al (1992), Watt (2000), Handke and Towse (2007), and Handke (2014). Functions of CMO are to set prices and standard terms, monitor use of copyright works, collect royalties, and distribute them among rights holders.…”

Section: Copyright Compensation Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Going means trouble and staying makes it double: the value of licensing recorded music online

2015

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This paper discusses whether a copyright compensation system (CCS) for recorded music-endowing private Internet subscribers with the right to download and use works in return for a fee-would be welfare increasing. It reports on the results of a discrete choice experiment conducted with a representative sample of the Dutch population consisting of 4986 participants. Under some conservative assumptions, we find that applied only to recorded music, a mandatory CCS could increase the welfare of rights holders and users in the Netherlands by over €600 million per year (over €35 per capita). This far exceeds current rights holder revenues from the market of recorded music of ca. €144 million per year. A monthly CCS fee of ca. €1.74 as a surcharge on Dutch Internet subscriptions would raise the same amount of revenues to rights holders as the current market for recorded music. With a voluntary CCS, the estimated welfare gains to users and rights holders are even greater for CCS fees below €20 on the user side. A voluntary CCS would also perform better in the long run, as it could retain a greater extent of market coordination. The results of our choice experiment indicate that a well-designed CCS for recorded music would simultaneously make users and rights holders better off. This result holds even if we correct for frequently observed rates of overestimation in contingent valuation studies.

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“…In general, to let a clearinghouse establish the most efficient 358 Ibid., pp. 361 For collecting societies, see Handke and Towse (2007) Spence (2009), p. 167. 359 For collecting societies, see Hansen andSchmidt-Bischoffshausen (2007), pp.…”

Section: A Similar Legal Regulation To Collecting Societies?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Liability Rules in Patent Law

Krauspenhaar¹

2015

Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition

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Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies

Cited by 22 publications

References 23 publications

Dealing with digital: the economic organisation of streamed music

Dealing with digital: the economic organisation of streamed music

Going means trouble and staying makes it double: the value of licensing recorded music online

Liability Rules in Patent Law

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