2007
DOI: 10.1007/s11151-007-9149-5
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Economics at the Federal Communications Commission: 2006–2007

Abstract: Content diversity, Economic experiments, Localism, Media ownership, News programming, Package bidding, Public affairs programming, Simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) auction, Spectrum auction design, Viewpoint diversity,

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Cited by 5 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…2 Froeb et al (2008) discuss the tradeoffs between a functional and divisional organization for economists within policy organizations. 3 Much of this background section borrows extensively from Marx (2006) and Connolly and Kwerel's (2007). public. The FCC has tried to implement this goal by designing auctions that specify and assign licenses quickly and efficiently, are robust to strategic behavior by bidders, raise significant revenue, and are perceived to be fair, transparent, and objective.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…2 Froeb et al (2008) discuss the tradeoffs between a functional and divisional organization for economists within policy organizations. 3 Much of this background section borrows extensively from Marx (2006) and Connolly and Kwerel's (2007). public. The FCC has tried to implement this goal by designing auctions that specify and assign licenses quickly and efficiently, are robust to strategic behavior by bidders, raise significant revenue, and are perceived to be fair, transparent, and objective.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the two previous survey articles on "Economics at the FCC", Marx (2006) and Connolly and Kwerel's (2007) highlighted several issues of interest to economists in the area of auction design, including auctions with endogenous license characteristics, anonymous bidding, and package bidding. The latter two were implemented in the recently concluded 700 MHz auction.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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