Economics and the Law: Where is There Consensus?

Moorhouse, John C.; Morriss, Andrew P.; Whaples, Robert

doi:10.1177/056943459904300209

“…Several other surveys have surveyed economists in particular fields. Fuchs (1996) surveys health economists; Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba (1998) survey labor economists and public economists; Whaples (1995) surveys economic historians; Whaples (1996) surveys labor economists; Moorhouse, Morriss, and Whaples (1999) survey law and economics scholars. There have also been surveys of economists in other countries, with many similar questions (Frey et al.…”

Section: Previous Surveys Of Economists' Policy Viewsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There a Free‐Market Economist in the House? The Policy Views of American Economic Association Members

Klein

¹

,

Stern

²

2007

American J Econ Sociol

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People often suppose or imply that free-market economists constitute a significant portion of all economists. We surveyed American Economic Association members and asked their views on 18 specific forms of government activism. We find that about 8 percent of AEA members can be considered supporters of free-market principles, and that less than 3 percent may be called strong supporters. The data is broken down by voting behavior (Democratic or Republican). Even the average Republican AEA member is "middle-of-theroad," not free-market. We offer several possible explanations of the apparent difference between actual and attributed views.

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“…In a survey among members of the American Law and Economics Association,Moorhouse, Morriss and Whaples (1999) find that 84% of respondents believe that common law is generally efficient and 42% consider it more efficient than civil law. 15 See, for instance, the analysis of the French civil code byJosselin and Marciano (2002).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking

Arruñada

¹

,

Andonova

²

2004

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Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19 th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

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Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking

Arruñada¹,

Andonova²

Handbook of New Institutional Economics

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Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19 th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

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Economics and the Law: Where is There Consensus?

Cited by 9 publications

References 2 publications

Is There a Free‐Market Economist in the House? The Policy Views of American Economic Association Members

Is There a Free‐Market Economist in the House? The Policy Views of American Economic Association Members

Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking

Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking

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