Economic Sources of Corporate Political Consenses: An Examination of Interindustry Relations

Mizruchi, Mark S.; Koenig, Thomas

doi:10.2307/2095582

Cited by 53 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…These investigations extend the work of economic sociologists who have previously pointed to the importance of considering the complex social systems in which firms are embedded as an important predictor of corporate political activity (e.g., Mizruchi & Koenig, 1986;Mizruchi, 1989;Burris, 2005). Boycotts are more likely to cause disruption when they attract more media attention, target their locus of attack at the parent-firm level, and protest more salient issues.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 60%

Blacklisted Benefactors: The Political Contestation of Non-Market Strategy

McDonnell

Werner

2015

AMPROC

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This paper explores whether and how contentious stakeholders can disrupt a firm's non-market strategy. We offer the first systematic study of the effect of public protest on corporate political activity, using a unique database that allows us to empirically analyze the impact of social movement boycotts on targeted firms' campaign contributions. We show that boycotts lead to significant reductions in the amount of targets' campaign contributions and increase the proportion of contributions that politicians refund. These results highlight the importance of considering how a firm's socio-political environment shapes its non-market strategy. We supplement this primary analysis by drawing from social movement theory to extrapolate and test a number of mechanisms that moderate the extent to which movement challenges effectively disrupt corporate political activity. ABSTRACTThis paper explores whether and how contentious stakeholders can disrupt a firm's non-market strategy. We offer the first systematic study of the effect of public protest on corporate political activity, using a unique database that allows us to empirically analyze the impact of social movement boycotts on targeted firms' campaign contributions. We show that boycotts lead to significant reductions in the amount of targets' campaign contributions and increase the proportion of contributions that politicians refund. These results highlight the importance of considering how a firm's socio-political environment shapes its non-market strategy. We supplement this primary analysis by drawing from social movement theory to extrapolate and test a number of mechanisms that moderate the extent to which movement challenges effectively disrupt corporate political activity.* We would like to thank Caroline Flammer, Olga Hawn, Shon Hiatt, Brayden King, Jiao Luo, Jeff Macher, Michael Malbin, and Ed Walker, as well as seminar participants at Wharton, Yale University, Columbia University, the University of Michigan, Chicago Booth, the University of Texas, the University of Maryland, Rice University, Boston University, and Ohio State University for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. This paper was previously presented at the 2014 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association and the Strategic Management Society. Blacklisted Benefactors 2 Blacklisted Benefactors: The Political Contestation of Non-Market StrategyFirms exist in multiple institutional environments, requiring interaction with myriad audiences who often have conflicting expectations and demands (Scott, 1987;Greenwood, 2011). One of the most critical of these audiences is the state, which crafts the rules of the game that define market competition and creates the system of laws and punishments that comprise the formal, regulatory pillar of firms' institutional environments (Scott, 2001). Though legal rules certainly constrain corporate behavior, firms do not passively acquiesce to the iron cage of their regulatory institutions. Rather, work at the inte...

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 60%

Blacklisted Benefactors: The Political Contestation of Non-Market Strategy

McDonnell

Werner

2015

AMPROC

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“…The column titled "specificity" refers to the extent to which the study links corporate political activity to specific Marcus, 1994Mizruchi & Koenig, 1986Oster, 1982Shaffer, 1992Wood, 1985Y offie, 1987Zeithaml, Keim & Baysinger, 1988 strategic-political issues (readers should not regard these ratings as normative). Studies described as "1ow"on this dimension measure general aspects of political activity (e.g., patterns of adaptation to regulatory uncertainty); most of these studies measure theoretical constructs rather than responses to specific issues.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More specifically, several studies utilize PAC data to link industry structure and corporate strategy to political activity. PAC data are used as a measure for testing broad topics such as why some industries are more politically active than others (Grier, Munger & Roberts, 1994), the level of political consensus between vertically related industries (Mizruchi & Koenig, 1986), and the effects of industry concentration on political activity (Grier, Munger & Robert, 1991).…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Firm-level Responses to Government Regulation: Theoretical and Research Approaches

Shaffer

1995

Journal of Management

281

202

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Historically,the relationship between business firms and government has usually been approached in terms of its effects on the process of representative democracy (i.e., the implications of business political activity for the functioning of government). More recently, perspectives on business-government relations have developed within a managerialframework [i.e., from the viewpoint of the corporation and the manager]. This article discusses the consequences of public policies for the competitive environment of the firm, which provides one explanation for political behavior. Firm-level responses include both strategic adaptation and attempts to influence public policy. It discusses a variety of research approaches to understanding the firm S strategic use of public policy processes, as well as suggestions for further research.

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“…While Thomas Koenig (1979) was the first scholar to adopt this line of enquiry, Beth Mintz and Michael Schwartz picked up the issue in the early 1980s and published an influential article on interlocks and interest group formation (Mintz and Schwartz 1981). Later, Mark Mizruchi worked with Tom Koenig on the impact of interlocks on corporate donations to political parties and candidacies (Mizruchi and Koenig 1986). They found none.…”

Section: How the Business Schools Took Over In The Usamentioning

confidence: 99%