Economic Shocks and Rebel Tactics: Evidence from Colombia

Wright, Austin L.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2660582

Cited by 16 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…These vary with conflict parties' balance of power. whereas those with higher military endowments should be more able to openly attack the enemy while also being much less able to hide from it than weak insurgents (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014;Buhaug 2010;Butler and Gates, 2009;Fearon, 2007;Wright, 2016). Due to this difference in the tactics used by differently endowed rebels, governments also employ different military countermeasures to combat them.…”

Section: Theory: Linking Military Technology and Conflict Intensitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Military Technology and Human Loss in Intrastate Conflict: The Conditional Impact of Arms Imports

Mehrl

Thurner

2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Although often conjectured, there is a lack of empirical evidence whether international inflows of military technology render intrastate conflicts more violent. We address this question and argue that expansions in governments’ ability to fight aggravate the lethality of intrastate war. However, we expect this effect to be conditioned by rebels’ military endowments and their choice of tactics. Where rebels are weak, they avoid open combat, and additional governmental arms imports have no effect on the number of casualties. In contrast, governmental arms imports cause human losses to multiply when rebels have achieved military parity or superiority and, as a consequence, use conventional combat tactics. This hypothesis is tested on the number of battle-related deaths in intrastate conflict, 1989 to 2011, using, for the first time, data on governmental imports of both major conventional weapons and small arms. Results support our propositions and are robust to instrumenting for imports of both types of weapons.

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Section: Theory: Linking Military Technology and Conflict Intensitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Military Technology and Human Loss in Intrastate Conflict: The Conditional Impact of Arms Imports

Mehrl

Thurner

2020

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…Both literatures face the challenge of accounting in some way for insurgents’ strategic adjustment in response to anticipated changes in force levels and locations. Our research design is similar to other studies that exploit plausibly random sources of variation in insurgent (Wright, ) or counterinsurgent (Lyall, 2009) strategies to assess the effectiveness of counterinsurgency policies. In our study, security force deployments were assigned primarily by using the history of violence around polling centers to estimate levels of election‐day violence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Damaging democracy? Security provision and turnout in Afghan elections^†

Condra

Callen²,

Iyengar

et al. 2019

Economics & Politics

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In emerging democracies, elections are encouraged as a route to democratization. However, not only does violence often threaten these elections, but citizens often view as corrupt the security forces deployed to combat violence. We examine the effects of such security provision. In Afghanistan's 2010 parliamentary election, polling centers with similar histories of pre‐election violence unintentionally received different deployments of the Afghan National Police, enabling identification of police's effects on turnout. Using data from the universe of polling sites and various household surveys, data usually unavailable in conflict settings, we estimate increases in police presence decreased voter turnout by an average of 30%. Our results adjudicate between competing theoretical mechanisms through which security forces could affect turnout, and show behavior is not driven by voter anticipation of election‐day violence. This highlights a pitfall for building government legitimacy via elections in weakly institutionalized and conflict‐affected states.

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“…In sum, resource shocks enhancing rebel capacity increase conventional attacks, while those reducing rebel capacity increase irregular attacks (Wright 2020). These effects vary at the local level within rebel movements.…”

Section: Combat Tacticsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Canonical work by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) and Bueno de Mesquita (2013) show how and why tactics vary across insurgencies, em-phasizing the interaction of rebel and state capacity, and economic conditions. But as recent studies show, tactics also vary within militant organizations over time (Horowitz, Perkoski, and Potter 2018;Wright 2020). Studying tactical diversity in militant violence is critical for developing generalized theories of political violence (Sambanis 2004).…”

Section: Figure 1: Border Control Is a Common Counterinsurgent Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Apart from rebels' direct profits from cross-border activities, smuggling and tax rents also represent lost income for state coffers strained by civil conflict. Lost government revenue translates to reduced government fighting capacity (Wright 2020). Because cross-border rebel activities have the dual effect of increasing rebel capacity and reducing state capacity, counterinsurgents have strong incentives to control borders against transnational insurgencies.…”

Section: The Logic Of Border Control In Counterinsurgencymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Border Control and Insurgent Tactics

Blair

2020

Preprint

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Where cross-border sanctuary enables rebels to marshal external support, classical theories of counterinsurgency extol the strategic value of border control. By sealing borders, counterinsurgents can erode transnational rebels' resources, degrading the quality of rebellion. Building on theories linking resources and technologies of rebellion, I posit a fortification dilemma inherent in border control strategies. Well-resourced rebels with external support can afford conventional attacks and indiscriminate violence. When counterinsurgent border control efforts interdict foreign logistics, insurgents compensate by cultivating greater local support. In turn, rebels prefer more irregular attacks and reduced civilian victimization. These effects are mitigated when rebels enjoy active sponsorship from state patrons and where rebels can access alternate smuggling routes, both of which subvert counterinsurgents' border interdiction efficacy. Because counterinsurgent border control efforts trade-off reduced insurgent capabilities for greater competition over local hearts-and-minds, border control is best used in tandem with population-centric counterinsurgency. I illustrate this theory with archival evidence from the Algerian War of Independence, and test it using declassified microdata on border fortification and violence in a difference-indifferences setting in Iraq.

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Economic Shocks and Rebel Tactics: Evidence from Colombia

Cited by 16 publications

References 54 publications

Military Technology and Human Loss in Intrastate Conflict: The Conditional Impact of Arms Imports

Military Technology and Human Loss in Intrastate Conflict: The Conditional Impact of Arms Imports

Damaging democracy? Security provision and turnout in Afghan elections^†

Border Control and Insurgent Tactics

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Economic Shocks and Rebel Tactics: Evidence from Colombia

Cited by 16 publications

References 54 publications

Military Technology and Human Loss in Intrastate Conflict: The Conditional Impact of Arms Imports

Military Technology and Human Loss in Intrastate Conflict: The Conditional Impact of Arms Imports

Damaging democracy? Security provision and turnout in Afghan elections†

Border Control and Insurgent Tactics

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Damaging democracy? Security provision and turnout in Afghan elections^†