Economic Reform and the Military: China, Cuba, and Syria in Comparative Perspective

Mora, Frank O.; Wiktorowicz, Quintan

doi:10.1177/002071520304400201

Cited by 21 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Favorable policies such as tax breaks, subsidies, access to infrastructure and military's equipment and facilities, use of cheap and conscript labor, military's commercial and technological advantage, and the unavoidable corruption that ensues such activities undermines market competition and distorts the civilian economy. This makes the private sector weak and unable to compete with military's corporations in the market (Mora and Wiktorowicz 2003).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, military involvement in the economy has implications for the economy. A military that enjoys favorable policies from the government-such as receiving subsidies and tax exemption-and utilizes cheap labor by using soldiers in economic activities might threaten the private sector through unequal competition (Mora and Wiktorowicz 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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State Security or Exploitation: A Theory of Military Involvement in the Economy

Izadi

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Why does the military in some countries get involved in the economy by running profit-making enterprises and what leads governments to permit such involvement? Running household appliance factories, transportation agencies, banks, hotels, etc., are indeed unrelated to national security and are far removed from the regular roles assigned to militaries. Such involvement has further implications for both politics and the economy. I argue that the process of military involvement in the economy functions as a survival strategy for leaders and a profit-making scheme for the military. Using original cross-national data on the emergence of military involvement in the economy, this research demonstrates that militaries are more likely to get involved in the economy when the military’s institutional interests are at risk and when the government has to rely on the military to maintain power. Leaders allow the military to benefit financially through economic activities in order to stay in power.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

State Security or Exploitation: A Theory of Military Involvement in the Economy

Izadi

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…For example, the pressures to economically liberalize autocracies in economic crisis situations usually come at the expense of payments and other forms of patronage extended to members of the ruling coalition in return for loyalty. That is why there is a strong motivation for the regime to try to safeguard the military and to maintain its support by allowing it to undertake commercial activities to make up for the cuts in allotted budget (Mora & Wiktorowicz, 2003).…”

Section: Autocratic Rents and Regime Survivalmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Defection-Proofing” the Military and Authoritarian Regime Survival

Soliman¹

2021

WJSSR

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The question of loyalty in autocratic regimes has drawn a sustained scholarly interest, especially as autocratic leaders need to secure the support of their militaries to survive in office and to minimize the risk of a coup. Among the commonly employed mechanisms in this regard is the extension of extra-budgetary financial rewards, including “Military-Owned Businesses (MOBs)”. Nevertheless, under the increasingly significant threat of an uprising from below, military defection remains the key for the success of the revolution. The question then becomes: under what conditions would a military defect from an autocratic ruling alliance? This paper presents one novel answer to this question, which is: militaries are “defection-proofed” in the face of mass uprisings when they develop financial dependency on the regime. This hypothesis is tested comparatively against the cases of mass protests in China (1989), Indonesia (1998), Thailand (2006), and Iran (2009).

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“…Its use for allegedly corrupt dealings by the Chinese elite has been highlighted by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ, 2014). The superficially strange model of competition amongst SOEs is surprisingly effective (Mora & Wiktorowicz, 2003;Xia, 2012). It is subject to opaque political direction by the State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which acts more as a regulator, ensuring political control, reinforced by a CPC committee inside each firm (Yeo, 2009).…”

Section: Telecommunications In Chinamentioning

confidence: 99%

China and Africa: Alternative Telecommunication Policies and Practices

Sutherland¹

2016

Afr. j. inf. commun. (Online)

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The Beijing Consensus is said to be a win-win for China and Africa. China has become a major force in global telecommunications markets, as a manufacturer, a content provider and in delivering services to its citizens. While the relationship between China and Africa has been explored in many areas, telecommunications has been ignored, despite its strong domestic performance, as well as the presence of Chinese equipment in African networks and in the hands of consumers. China has not exported its domestic model of competing state-owned operators, nor have those operators followed the "going out" strategy. However, manufacturers have benefitted from the Washington Consensus model of oligopolistic markets. In countries with higher risks, they have been aided by Chinese development banks and intergovernmental agreements. In a new policy model, for the Comoros and Ethiopia, Chinese firms have taken on outsourcing of network functions for the state-owned operators. Additionally, manufacturers have found several channels to supply feature-phones and smartphones at low prices, helping to widen access. Absent from African markets are the providers of Internet content and apps. There is very little evidence of spillover effects, with little knowledge being transferred. China has won from hardware sales in Africa, while Africans have won wider access to telecommunications, including states rejecting the Washington Consensus model.

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Economic Reform and the Military: China, Cuba, and Syria in Comparative Perspective

Cited by 21 publications

References 28 publications

State Security or Exploitation: A Theory of Military Involvement in the Economy

State Security or Exploitation: A Theory of Military Involvement in the Economy

“Defection-Proofing” the Military and Authoritarian Regime Survival

China and Africa: Alternative Telecommunication Policies and Practices

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