Economic Policy for Digital Attention Intermediaries

Peitz, Martin

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3654009

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 32 publications

(38 reference statements)

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“…Altogether, our cases indicate that (particularly big) digital platforms have established monopoly-like structures in different ways that induce different types of market failure (unequal bargaining powers, anti-competitive behavior, windfall profits, information inadequacies, and moral hazard). Defining the relevant market turned out be difficult in a global, networked economy (Peitz, 2020) and might be explained by insufficient understanding of the characteristics of platform markets and their interplay with traditional markets. Moreover, platforms govern resources, which allows availability control, rationing, and coordination—actually tasks of the regulator.…”

Section: Systemizing the Problems With Digital Platformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Concerning the relationship among platform owners and other actors of the economy , literature spotlights the problems occurring from novel platform markets that undermine basic competition principles beyond the regulators’ spheres of influence. This involves antitrust constellations (Orbach, 2014) or perceptions of relevant markets (Peitz, 2020). Especially, the formation of monopolies was object of many studies, for example, Didi Chuxing in the taxi market in China (Xing and Sharif, 2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Identifying the patterns: Towards a systematic approach to digital platform regulation

Gleiß

Degen

Pousttchi

2023

Journal of Information Technology

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Digital platforms have proven to be efficient matchmakers in our networked economy and society. However, their tremendous potential is a double-edged sword, and concerns about their malpractices and negative impact have risen remarkably. In the light of practical relevance, research on digital platform regulation (DPR) did not contribute very much. Especially information systems (IS) which, as a discipline, seems predestined to explain the problems at the confluence of technology–economy–society, has barely grazed the issue of DPR. Particularly, a contribution is missing that at least explores the problems with digital platforms systematically and comprehensively. In response to this aim, we pursue a two-step approach: First, we apply qualitative meta-analysis of 211 cases as well as a number of regulation papers and actual regulation endeavors to identify and conceptualize the problem scope and potential regulatory approaches for platform problems. Second, we condense our findings into a conceptual model. Our findings show that digital platforms exploit both platform- and monopoly-related problems to assert themselves in different markets. Through their impactful platform governance, they even have become serious challengers to the regulator in controlling market access, key conditions and resources. At this, they rely on the efficient use of data and digital technologies to effectively orchestrate platform agents and their transactions. The outcome of the paper is a set of two structured instruments that fill a void in interdisciplinary research and provide support to DPR practitioners for a systematic approach to regulation.

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Section: Systemizing the Problems With Digital Platformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying the patterns: Towards a systematic approach to digital platform regulation

Gleiß

Degen

Pousttchi

2023

Journal of Information Technology

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Ecosystems and competition law in theory and practice

Jacobides

Lianos²

2021

Industrial and Corporate Change

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One of the most profound changes in the industrial landscape in the last decade has been the growth of business ecosystems—groups of connected firms, drawing on (digital) platforms that leverage their complementors and lock in their customers, exploiting the “bottlenecks” that emerge in new industry architectures. This has created new asymmetries of power, where the “field” of competition is not the relevant product market, as is usually the case in competition law, but rather the ecosystem of various complementary products and associated complementor firms. These dynamics raise novel concerns over competition. After examining the foundational elements of the ecosystem concept, we review how ecosystems are addressed within the current scope of competition law and identify the gap in the existing framework of conventional competition law. We then move to a critical review of current efforts and proposals in the European Union for providing regulatory remedies for ex ante and ex post resolution of problems, focusing on the current (2020) proposals of the Digital Market Act on ex ante regulation, with its particular focus on “gatekeepers.” We also review recent regulatory initiatives in European countries that focus on ex post regulation and on the role of business models and ecosystem architectures in regulation before providing a deep dive into proposed Greek legislation that explicitly focuses on ecosystem regulation. We conclude with our observations on the challenges in instituting and implementing a regulatory framework for ecosystems, drawing on research and our own engagement in the regulatory process.

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Economic Policy for Digital Attention Intermediaries

Cited by 2 publications

References 32 publications

Identifying the patterns: Towards a systematic approach to digital platform regulation

Identifying the patterns: Towards a systematic approach to digital platform regulation

Ecosystems and competition law in theory and practice

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