Economic Integration and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation

Magistretti, Giacomo; Tabellini, Marco

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3220028

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 87 publications

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“…Based on the differences between younger and older democracies, a learning effect is expected through increased levels in cultural and interpersonal globalisation in democracies with lower democracy stocks – similar to the argument of Magistretti and Tabellini (2019) who scrutinised the effects of global trade flows on democracies. This may be called the democratic catch-up effect, where democracies with low democracy stocks have more potential to improve their democratic qualities in terms of freedom, equality and control.…”

Section: Social Globalisation and Democratic Qualitiesmentioning

confidence: 83%

Social globalisation and quality of democracy: An analysis for old and young democracies

Jerabek

2021

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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The literature on globalisation and democracy has primarily paid attention to economic integration and its effects on democracies. Systematic empirical evidence on the effects of social globalisation on democracy is absent. This article intends to fill this gap. Social globalisation is disaggregated into interpersonal, information and cultural globalisation. I apply the generalised method of moments estimation and analyse democracies encompassing the periods 1970–1991 and 1991–2017. The results indicate that the democratic qualities affected by social globalisation are freedom of expression, equal access and protection, and the quality of elections. The moderating effect of a given country’s democracy stock has been confirmed across different estimations. However, and especially during the post–Cold War period, younger and older democracies benefit equally from the increased spread of information caused by globalisation with regard to equal access. Equally, both categories experience similar challenges with the rise of interpersonal globalisation in terms of the quality of elections.

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Section: Social Globalisation and Democratic Qualitiesmentioning

confidence: 83%

Social globalisation and quality of democracy: An analysis for old and young democracies

Jerabek

2021

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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“…This allows us to construct an instrument for the actual high skill intensive trade flows on the basis of geography. Our approach is based on the gravity model (Anderson, 2011 andAnderson andvan Wincoop, 2003) and closely follows Feyrer (2019), Blanchard and Olney (2017), Pascali (2017) and Magistretti and Tabellini (2020). We begin by constructing estimates of "predicted trade flows" of high skill intensive products.…”

Section: Instrumentation Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide

Aksoy¹,

Guriev²,

Treisman³

2022

Preprint

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We provide the first large-scale, global evidence on the impact of the skill composition of trade on political approval. We show that political implications of trade shocks depend on the relationship between workers’ skills and the characteristics of goods traded. Using Gallup World Poll surveys of a million respondents from 120 countries over 2005-2018, we show that growth in high skill intensive exports increases confidence in government among skilled individuals relative to unskilled ones. Growth in high skill intensive imports has the opposite effect. Growth in low skill intensive exports (imports) increases (decreases) confidence in government among unskilled individuals relative to skilled ones. Toidentify causal relationships, we construct instruments based on time-varying effects of air and sea distances on bilateral trade in goods of different skill intensity.

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“…For this reason, as a final robustness check we estimate the static equation 5 using PPML estimator. A similar approach for additional robustness checks is also employed by Magistretti and Tabellini (2019) for the dynamic panel data model. We find that, with respect to the key variables, the PPML model yields results qualitatively similar to the dynamic panel data model estimated through system GMM approach presented in Section 4.4.…”

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confidence: 99%

Political economy of aid allocation: The case of Arab donors

2021

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By exploiting a unique data set on aid allocation by major Arab donors, this paper explores the relationship between aid allocation and the strategic alignment of donors with recipients as well as the developmental need of recipients. To motivate our empirical work, we first develop a new theory of aid allocation, wherein a representative donor country's payoff depends on both the well-being of the representative recipient country as well as its strategic alignment with the donor. Our theoretical model suggests that there exists a positive relationship between donor's aid allocation and the geopolitical and cultural alignment of the recipient country.Our model also predicts that donors allocate more aid to recipient countries with higher levels of country capacity. To test the prediction of our theory empirically, we construct a new measure of geopolitical and cultural alignment for recipient countries by using principal component analysis.We employ this measure and a set of control variables to show that the geopolitical and cultural alignment of a recipient country and its capacity to implement development projects are the key determinants of aid allocation from the Arab donors. K E Y W O R D SForeign Aid, geopolitical and cultural alignment, political economy of aid | 2461 KIBRIA et Al. | INTRODUCTIONAlthough the stated objective of foreign aid is typically the economic development of recipient countries, there is a perception that foreign aid may also be politically motivated. These political motives may even be overt. For example, United States aid to both Israel and Egypt since the Camp David Accords is designed to keep the peace between these two countries. However, political motives for aid are more often covert or without clearly stated political objectives. To what extent are foreign aid allocations due to the political alignment of recipient countries with donors rather than their development needs? This paper provides a theoretical framework to address this question and empirically assesses the predictions of the model.Foreign aid allocation in response to a recipient's position on a particular political issue, such as voting behaviour at the United Nations (UN), has empirically been addressed in the literature (see

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Economic Integration and Democracy: An Empirical Investigation

Cited by 5 publications

References 87 publications

Social globalisation and quality of democracy: An analysis for old and young democracies

Social globalisation and quality of democracy: An analysis for old and young democracies

Globalization, Government Popularity, and the Great Skill Divide

Political economy of aid allocation: The case of Arab donors

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