Economic Growth and Judicial Independence, a Dozen Years on: Cross-Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators

Academic freedom, institutions, and productivity

“…16 16 Causality may be a general problem and it remains a possible concern that, for example, judicial accountability and trade are endogenous in our regressions. While we cannot rule this out with the type of data available, we nevertheless note that a number of studies find suggestive evidence of a causal direction from these variables to income or growth: see, for example, Voigt (2008), Voigt and Gutmann (2013), and Voigt et al (2015) for judicial accountability, and Noguer and Siscart (2005), Brückner and Lederman (2015), and Ma et al (2019) for trade openness. …”

Judicial Self‐Governance Index: Towards better understanding of the role of judges in governing the judiciary

“…The argument that to secure judicial independence the judiciary must be institutionally insulated from other actors has not only been present in the scholarly literature (e.g., Larkins, 1996; Rios‐Figueroa, 2006, p. 4; Shetreet, 2011, p. 3), but can also be found in several documents backed by democracy and rule of law promoters such as Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 12 on the independence, efficiency, and responsibilities of Judges of the Committee of Ministers issued by the Council of Europe, the European Charter on the statute for judges approved in 1998 by the European Association of Judges and the Universal Charter of the Judge adopted in 1999 by the International Association of Judges. However, several scholarly works suggest that structural insulation is not sufficient to secure de facto independence, whether measured at the level of actual decisionmaking regarding judicial careers (Spáč, 2020; Voigt et al, 2015) or at that of adjudication (Popova, 2012). Other empirical research shows that the establishment of judicial councils was also frequently tied in with expectations of better performance in terms of efficiency or quality of decision‐making, believing judges to be better equipped to regulate their own field (Urbániková & Šipulová, 2018).…”

“…The EU Justice Scoreboard, a detailed dataset describing the performance of EU judiciaries, also does not allow one to measure the participation of judges in judicial governance, as it analyzes different parameters and changes the scale for their evaluation in individual editions (from binary yes/no to multiple choice; Hayo & Voigt, 2014, 2016). 7 Some indicators related to judicial governance appear in the de jure judicial independence index suggested by Hayo and Voigt and in the judicial independence index by Feld and Voigt (2003; also Voigt et al, 2015). However, both indexes collect only limited data on power and competences held by judges and focus on measuring their independence instead.…”

Tactics of resistance and post-conflict judicial independence

“…Courts have been criticized for being antidemocratic and counter-majoritarian organizations that frustrate the popular will of communities or elected representatives (Bickel, 1962). However, contemporary scholarship highlights how courts can, among other things, protect human rights (Keith, 2002(Keith, , 2012Powell & Staton, 2009), delineate the boundaries of state power wielded by different governing authorities (Scribner, 2013), encourage economic development (Voigt, Gutmann & Feld, 2015;Feld & Voigt, 2003), intervene to address electoral irregularities (Trochev, 2013), and prevent democratic backsliding (Gibler & Randazzo, 2011). Thus, courts are integral to bolstering and maintaining a healthy democracy and respect for the rule of law (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2019;Epp, 1998).…”