Economic causes of the collapse of the Weimar Republic

Borchardt, Knut; Lambert, Peter

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511622304.012

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…These results suggest that real wage rigidity -or more precisely, the continuing rise of unit wage cost in excess of productivity growth -was a major channel crisis propagation, consistent with findings of Borchardt (1990). Keeping real wages high through political arbitration had strong, pernicious effects on employment after 1929.…”

Section: The Wage Channel Of Crisis Propagationsupporting

confidence: 79%

“…Historians have been in bitter controversies about alternatives to Germany's fiscal policy during the slump since Borchardt's (1979) claim that the government faced a borrowing constraint (see the opposing views in Borchardt, 1990;Holtfrerich, 1990; as well as the restatement of the traditional position in Ferguson and Temin, 2003). The austerity policy pursued seems easier to motivate and explain with reference to Germany's mounting foreign debt problems (Ritschl, 2002).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Reparations, Deficits, and Debt Default: The Great Depression in Germany

Ritschl¹

2013

The Great Depression of the 1930s

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Section: The Wage Channel Of Crisis Propagationsupporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reparations, Deficits, and Debt Default: The Great Depression in Germany

Ritschl¹

2013

The Great Depression of the 1930s

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“…In contrast, the German government continued its deflationary policy after the summer 1931, accompanied by political turmoil and heated discussions about the appropriate course of economic policy (see Borchardt 1979Borchardt , 1990. In 15/16…”

Section: Iii2 the Decision (Not) To Pursue Expansionary Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Europe’s Great Depression: Coordination Failure after the First World War

Wolf¹

2013

The Great Depression of the 1930s

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. had not yet come to an end -indeed it did not end before 1945. Both, domestic and international institutions suffered from a lack of reciprocal trust and commitment, which can be clearly illustrated in the realm of monetary policy but affected many other areas of policymaking, such as energy or migration policies. These institutions in turn affected expectations and thereby the extent to which for example expansionary policies could be effective. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: E50, F50, N14.

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“…56 Using the highest and the lowest values in Table 1 Interest rates was not artificially low as a result of an inflow of foreign capital. 60 Instead, the normalisation of conditions in German money and capital markets was primarily responsible 59 The extent to which Weimar's economy was already doomed in the second half of the 1920s has been hotly discussed by Borchardt (1991), Holtfrerich (1990), Ritschl (1997), andVoth (1995). Balderston (1982) provides evidence that wages were indeed out of line with productivity (by the standards of 1913), but that this is not necessarily a sign of Weimar's economy being destined for collapse.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…"PferdekurWarum?". 107 Frankfurter Zeitung, 13.5.1927Frankfurter Zeitung, 15.5.1927 Balderston 1992, James 1990, Borchardt 1991 Bernanke and James 1991, Eichengreen and Grossman 1994. 113 Mishkin 1991 Gilchrist 1996.…”

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With a Bang, not a Whimper: Pricking Germany's 'Stock Market Bubble' in 1927 and the Slide into Depression

Voth

2001

SSRN Journal

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In May 1927, the German central bank intervened indirectly to reduce lending to equity investors. The crash that followed ended the only stock market boom during Germany's relative stabilization 1924-28. This paper examines the factors that lead to the intervention as well as its consequences. We argue that genuine concern about the 'exuberant' level of the stock market, in addition to worries about an inflow of foreign funds, tipped the scales in favour of intervention. The evidence strongly suggests that the German central bank under Hjalmar Schacht was wrong to be concerned about stockprices -there was no bubble. Also, the Reichsbank was mistaken in its belief that a fall in the market would reduce the importance of shortterm foreign borrowing, and help to ease conditions in the money market. The misguided intervention had important real effects. Investment suffered, helping to tip Germany into depression. JEL classification codesE31, E43, E44, N14, N24

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Economic causes of the collapse of the Weimar Republic

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Reparations, Deficits, and Debt Default: The Great Depression in Germany

Reparations, Deficits, and Debt Default: The Great Depression in Germany

Europe’s Great Depression: Coordination Failure after the First World War

With a Bang, not a Whimper: Pricking Germany's 'Stock Market Bubble' in 1927 and the Slide into Depression

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