Ecology and the Limits of Justice: Establishing Capability Ceilings in Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach

Abstract

Human impacts on large-scale ecological interactions effectively confer fundamental advantages of wealth and power to some members of society and not to others. As illustrated here by reference to a 1993 cholera outbreak resulting from degradation of aquatic ecosystems, these impacts can pose barriers to the normal channels through which one might pursue individual advantage, thereby raising tensions for liberal theories of justice that are committed both to basic liberties and to distributive fairness. I first illustrate these tensions by reference to John Rawls's theory. I then argue that although Nussbaum's theory, which emerged in dialogue with Rawls's, improves upon it in this regard, it remains subject to the same basic tensions. Instituting 'capability ceilings' that impose a limit on the set of basic opportunities available to people would help resolve this tension. Thus, in addition to Nussbaum's proposal for establishing capability thresholds, I defend capability ceilings as a friendly amendment to her theory.John Rawls, Martha Nussbaum, Justice, Capabilities, Environmental justice, Ecosystems, Political liberalism, Value conflict, Habitat change, Resource inequality,

Employing the Capability Approach in Conceptualizing Sustainable Development

“…In her latest book, Nussbaum (2011, pp. 163 -166) acknowledges the importance of 'environmental matters' and draws on Holland (2008aHolland ( , 2008b, who proposes to expand Nussbaum's list by treating certain ecological conditions as a meta-capability 21 necessary for all the capabilities on her list. However, as with regard to democracy and social institutions, Nussbaum does not go on to discuss what such a treatment would mean with regard to the CA as a (partial) conception of justice.…”

A Capability Approach to Intergenerational Justice? Examining the Potential of Amartya Sen's Ethics with Regard to Intergenerational Issues

“…Holland (2008), for instance, shows that an account of thresholds leaves a lot to be desired: for instance, it cannot solve fundamental conflicts of capabilities. It also does not help us in finding a maximum; that is, in answering the question of how many capabilities should be protected at most.…”

“…12 We believe that the CA is a good basis for the definition of such a threshold-and we are not the only ones. One of the most convincing arguments of Breena Holland's work on Nussbaum's account of thresholds is that the CA is superior to a Rawlsian approach to questions of environmental justice, because it incorporates a more sophisticated account of human well-being (Holland 2008).…”

Ecological Functions and Functionings: Towards a Senian Analysis of Ecosystem Services

“…Holland (: 407) also argues that economistic approaches to environmental analysis have tended to assume that environmental goods are public and therefore have indivisible benefits. Holland argues that this approach relies too uncritically on a Rawlsian analysis because it under‐analyses how different people have different levels of access to benefits.…”