2022
DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2022.104658
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Ecological firewalls for synthetic biology

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Cited by 8 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…Getting it right will mean balancing brave investments ( Hodgson et al, 2022 ) with monitoring the effects, including developing an ethics and a taxonomy for working with AI-synbio-human hybrids and intelligence ( Nesbeth et al, 2016 ; Damiano and Stano, 2023 ), dealing with new synthetic pathogens ( O’Brien and Nelson, 2020 ), saying carefully goodbye to the natural world ( Lawrence, 2019 ; Webster-Wood et al, 2022 ; Bongard and Levin, 2023 ) or at least radically enhancing biocontainment ( Schmidt and de Lorenzo, 2016 ; Aparicio, 2021 ; Vidiella and Solé, 2022 ; Hoffmann, 2023 ), as well as developing new approaches to worker safety ( Murashov et al, 2020 ). This leads into the issue of dual use of concern, which currently is a binary issue even though it is about to become immensely complex, requiring a more nuanced approach ( Evans, 2022 ; Sandbrink, 2023a ), given the legitimate concern with deliberate, perhaps even deliberate synthetic pandemics ( Sandbrink, 2023b ).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Getting it right will mean balancing brave investments ( Hodgson et al, 2022 ) with monitoring the effects, including developing an ethics and a taxonomy for working with AI-synbio-human hybrids and intelligence ( Nesbeth et al, 2016 ; Damiano and Stano, 2023 ), dealing with new synthetic pathogens ( O’Brien and Nelson, 2020 ), saying carefully goodbye to the natural world ( Lawrence, 2019 ; Webster-Wood et al, 2022 ; Bongard and Levin, 2023 ) or at least radically enhancing biocontainment ( Schmidt and de Lorenzo, 2016 ; Aparicio, 2021 ; Vidiella and Solé, 2022 ; Hoffmann, 2023 ), as well as developing new approaches to worker safety ( Murashov et al, 2020 ). This leads into the issue of dual use of concern, which currently is a binary issue even though it is about to become immensely complex, requiring a more nuanced approach ( Evans, 2022 ; Sandbrink, 2023a ), given the legitimate concern with deliberate, perhaps even deliberate synthetic pandemics ( Sandbrink, 2023b ).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, different types of ecological firewalls for the containment of engineered strains or communities have recently been proposed, and their efficiency has been calculated. These approaches rely on resource availability of pollutants as growth substrates, mutualistic dependency of ecological factors, or parasitic interactions of an engineered strain with the resident community [99] . However, no practical work on ecological firewalls has been performed so far, so that it is difficult to judge whether the effect that is predicted by differential equations on paper can be replicated in a complex real‐world scenario.…”
Section: The Quest For Synthetic Biology‐assisted Marine Bioremediationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These approaches rely on resource availability of pollutants as growth substrates, mutualistic dependency of ecological factors, or parasitic interactions of an engineered strain with the resident community. [99] However, no practical work on ecological firewalls has been performed so far, so that it is difficult to judge whether the effect that is predicted by differential equations on paper can be replicated in a complex real-world scenario. In summary, methods for safeguarded deployment would constitute a middle ground between containment and spread of genetically enhanced microbes in the environment; but it would be possible that the engineered safeguard mechanisms are disabled by evolutionary adapta- tions or horizontal gene transfer between engineered strains and native microorganisms.…”
Section: Containment or Spread Of Genetically Enhanced Microbes For B...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The design principles also aim at a control of the engineered strains thanks to ecological nonlinearities. In this context, some ecological interaction motifs [ 123 ] and network-level constraints [ 124 ] act as firewalls to the spread of synthetic microbes. An example of this view is the potential of terraforming for drylands [ 97 , 98 , 125 ].…”
Section: Biodiversity Adaptation and Engineeringmentioning
confidence: 99%