Ecological Explanation between Manipulation and Mechanism Description

Pâslaru, Viorel

doi:10.1086/605812

Cited by 14 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 21 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…The new mechanistic philosophy of science (NMP) has been very successful in accounting for how mechanistic explanation (ME) is used in several scientific areas. Even though mechanisms have been increasingly investigated in ecology since the 1980s, there are relatively few philosophical works devoted to elucidate how mechanisms are described and depicted in ecology (see Matthewson and Calcott 2011;Pâslaru 2009Pâslaru , 2015Raerinne 2011). One of the putative reasons, we believe, lies in the fact that ecological systems are influenced by multiple drivers at different spatial and time scales (Nelson et al 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of science in practice in ecological model building

et al. 2022

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This article addresses the contributions of the literature on the new mechanistic philosophy of science for the scientific practice of model building in ecology. This is reflected in a one-to-one interdisciplinary collaboration between an ecologist and a philosopher of science during science-in-the-making. We argue that the identification, reconstruction and understanding of mechanisms is context-sensitive, and for this case study mechanistic modeling did not present a normative role but a heuristic one. We expect our study to provides useful epistemic tools for the improvement of empirically-riven work in the debates about mechanistic explanation of ecological phenomena.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of science in practice in ecological model building

et al. 2022

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“…I have no doubt that these authors give a more or less accurate description of mechanisms at least in such biological disciplines as neurobiology, molecular biology, cytology, and perhaps even ecology (see Pâslaru 2009). However, I have one problem with their definition; namely, they do not tie their definition to any account of scientific explanation that would tell how or under what conditions (descriptions of) mechanisms are explanatory.…”

Section: Simple Causal Claims and Mechanistic Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, neither Glennan nor Craver have defended Woodward's modularity condition and neither of them discuss mechanistic explanations in the context of ecology as I do here. However, there is one paper that discusses mechanisms in ecology as well as their modularity, namely, Viorel Pâslaru's (2009). Pâslaru claims that Woodward's definition of mechanisms (to be defended in this section) is not sufficient for ecologists.…”

Section: Simple Causal Claims and Mechanistic Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When ecology is contrasted with other biological disciplines, such as genetics, molecular biology, and neurobiology, in which the mechanistic aspects of explanations seem to be more prominent, ecological causal explanations appear to be ''phenomenological'' invariant generalizations whose mechanistic aspects remain to be discovered. This is the reason why I am unable to provide the reader with a paradigmatic example of an ecological mechanism or mechanistic explanation (but see also Pâslaru 2009). Yet it is not my task to provide these, but rather it is the task of ecologists.…”

Section: Simple Causal Claims and Mechanistic Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Causal and Mechanistic Explanations in Ecology

Raerinne

2010

Acta Biotheor

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How are scientific explanations possible in ecology, given that there do not appear to be many-if any-ecological laws? To answer this question, I present and defend an account of scientific causal explanation in which ecological generalizations are explanatory if they are invariant rather than lawlike. An invariant generalization continues to hold or be valid under a special change-called an intervention-that changes the value of its variables. According to this account, causes are difference-makers that can be intervened upon to manipulate or control their effects. I apply the account to ecological generalizations to show that invariance under interventions as a criterion of explanatory relevance provides interesting interpretations for the explanatory status of many ecological generalizations. Thus, I argue that there could be causal explanations in ecology by generalizations that are not, in a strict sense, laws. I also address the issue of mechanistic explanations in ecology by arguing that invariance and modularity constitute such explanations.

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“…Italics added throughout for emphasis -V. P. 7 For a more detailed argument for linking activities and relationships exploitable for manipulation and control based on a different ecological case seePâslaru (2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

The mechanistic approach of The Theory of Island Biogeography and its current relevance

Pâslaru

2014

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in

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Philosophers of science have examined The Theory of Island Biogeography by Robert MacArthur and E. O. Wilson (1967) mainly due to its important contribution to modeling in ecology, but they have not examined it as a representative case of ecological explanation. In this paper, I scrutinize the type of explanation used in this paradigmatic work of ecology. I describe the philosophy of science of MacArthur and Wilson and show that it is mechanistic. Based on this account and in light of contributions to the mechanistic conception of explanation due to Craver (2007), and Bechtel and Richardson (1993), I argue that MacArthur and Wilson use a mechanistic approach to explain the species-area relationship. In light of this examination, I formulate a normative account of mechanistic explanation in ecology. Furthermore, I argue that it offers a basis for methodological unification of ecology and solves a dispute on the nature of ecology. Lastly, I show that proposals for a new paradigm of biogeography appear to maintain the norms of mechanistic explanation implicit in The Theory of Island Biogeography.

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Ecological Explanation between Manipulation and Mechanism Description

Cited by 14 publications

References 21 publications

Philosophy of science in practice in ecological model building

Philosophy of science in practice in ecological model building

Causal and Mechanistic Explanations in Ecology

The mechanistic approach of The Theory of Island Biogeography and its current relevance

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