EC Competition Law

Abstract

The development of competition law in the EU can be explored through three interrelated perspectives: the extent to which controversies in economic thinking affect the design of the law; how changing political visions about the objectives of competition law have caused shifts in the interpretation of the rules; and the institution in charge of applying the rules. The economic and political debates on competition law show that it is a contested terrain, and the way courts and competition authorities apply the law reflects their responses to the objectives and economics of competition law. By characterising the application of competition law as a continuous response to policy and economic debates, the author casts fresh perspectives on the subject. Written with competition law students in mind, Monti sets out economic concepts in a non-technical manner and explores the policy dimension of competition law by referring to key cases and contemporary policy initiatives.

How the Theory of Dialectical Antitrust Perceives the Role of Competition Authorities

“…The reason put forward by the Commission is that this requirement is an essential feature of the Leniency Notice. 64 However, while the immunity applicant is aware early in the proceedings that he has conditional immunity, an applicant for reduction of fines needs to satisfy the cumbersome 55 See, for instance, above n 15. 56 2006 Leniency Notice, paragraphs 26 and 30.…”

“…Economic approach theorists argue that the benefits to consumers from free-riders 20 with lower prices would be only on a short run basis. 21 In other words, although consumers may get benefits from free-riding distributors for their low price for a short run, it can harm more on the whole market and result in loss of consumer welfare in the long run. Even though the current guidelines of the KFTC illustrate some efficiency justification, 22 the criteria for exemption are not very clear.…”

“…Even though the current guidelines of the KFTC illustrate some efficiency justification, 22 the criteria for exemption are not very clear. In particular, the KFTC's decision in DPK International, 23 a territorial restriction case, showed its lack of capacity in understanding this justification. 24 16 Regarding transaction cost arguments, see R.H. Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm' (1937) 4 Economica, page 403.…”

“…17 20 Free-rider or free-riding problem incurs where no economic entity is willing to contribute towards the cost of something when he or she expects that someone else will bear the cost in order to get benefits. 21 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law, (2nd ed.) The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001, pages 171-6.…”

“…37 Many commentators regard the 10% settlement reduction offered by the Commission as insufficient to induce companies to settle. 38 However, this figure could be expected because of the Commission's crucial concern that its leniency programme offering higher possible reductions remains attractive. Another critical issue to the success of the Commission's settlement procedure will be the Commission's transparency in discussing the fine that a cartel participant can be expected to pay.…”