East Timor

Kingsbury, Damien

doi:10.1057/9780230621718

Cited by 40 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…Despite these traumas, Gusmão repeatedly made peace initiatives toward Indonesian officials responsible for the war. Beginning in the early 1990s, he offered proposals for negotiation and mediation (Kingsbury, 2009: 58). In the run-up to East Timor’s 1999 independence referendum, Gusmão declared that he would not blame Indonesia for the abuses its government had perpetrated, telling Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, “We are willing to overlook this and put it in the past” (Niner, 2009: 206).…”

Section: Gusmão As a Reconciliation-oriented Leadermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Pressures for confrontation and retributive justice offset, to an extent, the incentives for peacemaking and reconciliation noted above. During the liberation struggle, Gusmão’s policy of conciliation toward dissidents was opposed within FRETILIN, whose organizational culture tended to condemn as counterrevolutionary those who promoted accommodation with adversaries (Kingsbury, 2009: 54). When Gusmão negotiated a ceasefire in the early 1980s, for example, FRETILIN hard-liners rejected any such accommodation with Indonesia.…”

Section: Opposition To Reconciliation Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When Gusmão negotiated a ceasefire in the early 1980s, for example, FRETILIN hard-liners rejected any such accommodation with Indonesia. Hard-liners also opposed Gusmão’s outreach to the Catholic Church (Kingsbury, 2009: 57).…”

Section: Opposition To Reconciliation Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several commanders in FRETILIN’s guerrilla wing, FALINTIL, bypassed Gusmão to report directly to the external delegation in Lisbon and even attempted a coup against Gusmão. His conciliatory initiatives also antagonized ideologues among FRETILIN’s leadership in exile (Kingsbury, 2009: 57).…”

Section: Opposition To Reconciliation Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Political leadership, peacemaking, and post-conflict reconciliation: Xanana Gusmão and East Timor

Lieberfeld

2015

Leadership

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How and to what extent can individual leaders affect policy making during and after violent political conflicts? Why are some motivated to prioritize settlement and reconciliation? The article addresses these questions through a case study of Xanana Gusmão, who led the 24-year struggle against Indonesian military occupation in East Timor and became president. It assesses Gusmão's influence on conflict and post-conflict policy takes a trait-based approach to understanding the motivations and capabilities of Gusmão and other ''reconciliation-oriented leaders.'' Overview and theoretical frameworkCivil wars are prevalent, destructive, and often intractable, so the question of factors that promote peacemaking and reconciliation in such conflicts is central to international relations, political psychology, and related fields. Leadership has only recently begun to receive scholarly attention as a factor in negotiated settlement of international and intergroup conflicts (Aronoff, 2014: 2) and has still not been much considered in analyses of reconciliation in the post-conflict period. Political psychologists tend to agree that ''leadership style may have a direct impact on the policy-making process'' and political leaders' individual choices and behaviors reflect ''the interaction among situations, institutions, and individuals'' (Kaarbo, 2001: 95); however, research in political science on causes of war and peacemaking has focused mainly on impersonal structural factors to the virtual exclusion of the level of Leadership 0(0) 1-25 ! The Author(s) 2015 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav

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Section: Gusmão As a Reconciliation-oriented Leadermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Opposition To Reconciliation Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Opposition To Reconciliation Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Opposition To Reconciliation Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Political leadership, peacemaking, and post-conflict reconciliation: Xanana Gusmão and East Timor

Lieberfeld

2015

Leadership

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“…The Sagrada Familia was also the name of a mystical group originally linked to the anti‐Indonesian guerrillas in the mountains south of Baucau (Kingsbury :89). Dan confirmed that the two groups are not affiliated.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Book of Dan. The Door in the Tree. Emergent Frameworks for Faith and Healing among the Meto of Timor‐Leste

Rose

2017

Oceania

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Over the past 40 years, Timor‐Leste’s Oecussi enclave has seen significant urbanization, with many families choosing to relocate from the mountains to the district capital in search of economic and educational opportunity. This article revolves around the case study of a spiritual healer referred to as Brother (Maun) Dan who, after a purported encounter with Mary, Joseph, and the Baby Jesus on the sacred beach of Lifau, is believed to have acquired the ability to heal the sick and has organized his followers into a Catholic affiliated mystical organization called the Sacred Family. Situating Dan’s story within the literature on spirituality and healing in the region, this article explores how, through reconciling indigenous (meto) beliefs revolving around ancestral spirits and sacred landscapes with the high‐status foreign (kase) institution of the Catholic Church and its associated iconography and scripture, Dan has been able to deploy distinctly Timorese perspectives on health and healing to address the needs of people living in an increasingly globalized peri‐urban setting.

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In It for the Long Haul? Post‐conflict Statebuilding, Peacebuilding, and the Good Governance Agenda in Timor‐leste

Goldfinch

DeRouen

2014

Public Admin & Development

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SUMMARYStatebuilding after conflict often entails liberal peacebuilding measures. The end of the UN mission in post‐conflict Timor‐Leste in December 2012 provides a unique opportunity to investigate statebuilding in practice. The liberal peacebuilding agenda has met with stiff academic resistance—mainly from the critical theorist camp—and is questioned as an appropriate measure of …statebuilding success. We deploy instead the good governance (GG) agenda as a hybrid local‐liberal guide. Drawing on field work, interviews, and secondary documents, we investigate what we see as four key, intertwined and overlapping aspects of GG: state capacity including the establishment of a state bureaucracy, participation and the engagement of civil society, institution building and rule of law, and corruption control and transparency. We note GG provides a useful policy heuristic, while abstract “one‐size‐fits‐all” liberal peacebuilding models, which avoid the complexities of machinery of government issues, the time taken to develop institutions, and historical and contextual environments of countries, are likely to face severe problems. New states may be dependent on external forces to maintain monopoly of violence. The reversibility and uncertainty of statebuilding and the decades‐long commitment needed by international agencies are noted. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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East Timor

Cited by 40 publications

References 0 publications

Political leadership, peacemaking, and post-conflict reconciliation: Xanana Gusmão and East Timor

Political leadership, peacemaking, and post-conflict reconciliation: Xanana Gusmão and East Timor

The Book of Dan. The Door in the Tree. Emergent Frameworks for Faith and Healing among the Meto of Timor‐Leste

In It for the Long Haul? Post‐conflict Statebuilding, Peacebuilding, and the Good Governance Agenda in Timor‐leste

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