Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic.

Schwarz, Norbert; Bless, Herbert; Strack, Fritz; Klumpp, Gisela; Rittenauer-Schatka, Helga; Simons, Annette

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.61.2.195

Cited by 1,178 publications

(863 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…The latter typically cannot be traced exclusively to one specific source. Such an interpretation of their results also conforms with evidence indicating that in making inferences people appear to rely less on subjective assessments of memory (e.g., processing fluency) when they can attribute this memory to the experiment than when such an explicit attribution is impossible (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989;Oppenheimer, 2004;Schwarz et al, 1991).…”

Section: The Noncompensatory Status Of Recognition Informationsupporting

confidence: 84%

On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: Retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use.

Pachur¹,

Hertwig²

2006

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

105

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The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the authors argue that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension.

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Section: The Noncompensatory Status Of Recognition Informationsupporting

confidence: 84%

On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: Retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use.

Pachur¹,

Hertwig²

2006

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

105

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For example, past research has shown that individuals hold their attitudes with greater certainty when they perceive it was easy to generate thoughts in favor of their attitudes and difficult to generate thoughts against their attitudes (e.g., Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1998;Haddock, Rothman, & Schwarz, 1996;Schwarz et al, 1991). In one relevant study, Haddock, Rothman, and Schwarz (1996) instructed participants to generate either three or seven favorable or unfavorable thoughts in response to a position they supported.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Resistance Is Futile: Consequences of Failed Counterarguing for Attitude Certainty.

Rucker

Petty

2004

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

121

102

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This research tests the notion that attitudes after a failed attempt to counterargue may be stronger than attitudes after undirected thinking. Specifically, failed counterarguing may be accompanied by unique metacognitions that serve to strengthen the attitude. The present research examines this issue by giving participants a very strong message and instructing them to counterargue or simply think about the message. Across several experiments, attitudes were as favorable when individuals were trying to counterargue as when they were simply thinking, indicating that counterarguing failed to instill any extra resistance. However, attitudes were held with greater certainty following failed counterarguing compared with following undirected thinking. Furthermore, attitudes following failed counterarguing were more predictive of subsequent behavioral intentions. The metacognitions that follow failed counterarguing are addressed.

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“…Hence, if we ask participants to produce either one or three explanations for a (known) surprising outcome, their metacognitive sense should be that more cognitive work is required for the latter over the former and, consequently, even though they are still explaining the occurrence of the outcome, they will perceive the latter outcomes to be more surprising than the former (this manipulation is analogous to one used in the hindsight bias literature; see, e.g., Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka & Simons, 1991). Furthermore, it should be stressed that this "number-of-explanations" effect should only hold for known surprising outcomes, not for less-known outcomes, because known outcomes have a ready supply of possible explanations, whereas less-known outcomes do not.…”

Section: Experiments 5: Effects Of Explanation Task On Surprise Judgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Foster

Keane

2015

Cognitive Psychology

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The UCD community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters! (@ucd_oa) Some rights reserved. For more information, please see the item record link above. TitleWhy some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty Publisher's statement This is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Cognitive Psychology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Cognitive Psychology (VOL 81, ISSUE 2015, (2015 Early theories of surprise, including Darwin's, argued that it was predominantly a basic emotion. Recently, theories have taken a more cognitive view of surprise, casting it as a process of "making sense of surprising events". The current paper advances the view that the essence of this sense-making process is explanation; specifically, that people's perception of surprise is a metacognitive estimate of the cognitive work involved in explaining an abnormal event. So, some surprises are more surprising because they are harder toexplain. This proposal is tested in eight experiments that explore how (i) the contents of memory can influence surprise, (ii) different classes of scenarios can retrieve more/less relevant knowledge from memory to explain surprising outcomes, (iii) how partial explanations constrain the explanation process reducing surprise, (iv) how, overall, any factor that acts to increase the cognitive work in explaining a surprising event, results in higher levels of surprise (e.g., task demands to find several rather than just one explanation). Across the present studies, using a many different materials, paradigms and measures, it is consistently and repeatedly found that the difficulty of explaining a surprising outcome is the best predictor for people's perceptions of the surprisingness of events. Alternative accounts of these results are considered, as are future directions for this research.

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Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic.

Cited by 1,178 publications

References 31 publications

On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: Retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use.

On the psychology of the recognition heuristic: Retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use.

When Resistance Is Futile: Consequences of Failed Counterarguing for Attitude Certainty.

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

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