2004
DOI: 10.2308/accr.2004.79.3.645
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Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation: Evidence from China's Accounting-Based Regulation of Rights Issues

Abstract: From 1996 to 1998, listed companies in China were required to achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) of 10 percent in each of the previous three years before they could apply for permission to issue additional shares. As a result of this rule, there was a heavy concentration of ROEs in the area just above 10 percent. We show that the Chinese regulators appear to have scrutinized firms using excess amounts of nonoperating income to reach the 10 percent hurdle. In addition, their ability to do so seems to have… Show more

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Cited by 501 publications
(304 citation statements)
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“…In addition, the majority of previous studies have investigated Chinese listed companies (Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000;Chen & Yuan, 2004;Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 2007;Liu & Lu, 2007;Wang & Yung, 2011). Ding et al (2007) and Wang and Yung (2011) have found that state-owned companies manage earnings less than privately-owned companies.…”
Section: State Ownership and Earnings Managementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, the majority of previous studies have investigated Chinese listed companies (Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000;Chen & Yuan, 2004;Ding, Zhang, & Zhang, 2007;Liu & Lu, 2007;Wang & Yung, 2011). Ding et al (2007) and Wang and Yung (2011) have found that state-owned companies manage earnings less than privately-owned companies.…”
Section: State Ownership and Earnings Managementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The overwhelming demand for rights offering forced the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) to use the return on equity (ROE) requirement to set the threshold. As a result, not only did a majority of firms manipulate earnings to meet the ROE requirement (Chen and Yuan, 2004;Haw et al, 2005;Yu, Du, and Sun, 2006;Liu and Lu, 2007), but also local governments provided subsidies to help listed firms, especially those firms largely held by local governments, to boost their ROE (Chen, Lee, and Li, 2008).…”
Section: Structural Changes In Firms' Access To the Capital Marketmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Specifically, contractual terms in government regulations create strong incentives for firms to manage earnings to maintain their listing status relative to incentives to provide investors with transparent information. For example, several studies document the phenomenon that firms manage their earnings to meet the regulatory ROE benchmark for rights issue (Chen and Yuan, 2004;Haw et al, 2005;Yu, Du, and Sun, 2006). Moreover, the delisting regulation that states that a firm will be delisted if it reports a loss for three consecutive years gives managers another strong incentive to manipulate earnings upward.…”
Section: Financial Reporting: Accounting Standards Reform and Firms' mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They also typically raise further funds through rights issues after IPO (Chen & Yuan, 2004;Wang, Wei, & Pruitt, 2006).…”
Section: Leveragementioning
confidence: 99%