Early transformation of the Chinese power sector to avoid additional coal lock-in

Abstract

Emission reduction from the coal-dominated power sector is vital for achieving China's carbon mitigation targets. Although the coal expansion has been slowed down due to the cancellation of and delay in new construction, coal-based power was responsible for over one third of China's energyrelated CO 2 emissions by 2018. Moreover, with a technical lifetime of over 30 years, current investment in coal-based power could hinder CO 2 mitigation until 2050. Therefore, it is important to examine whether the current coal-based power planning aligns with the long-term climate targets. This paper introduces China's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) goals and an ambitious carbon budget along with global pathways well-below 2 degrees that are divided into five integrated assessment models, which are two national and three global models. We compare the models' results with bottom-up data on current capacity additions and expansion plans to examine if the NDC targets are in line with 2-degree pathways. The key findings are: 1. NDC goals alone are unlikely to lead to significant reductions in coal-based power generation. On the contrary, more plants may be built before 2030; 2. this would require an average of 187-261 TWh of annual coal-based power capacity reduction between 2030 and 2050 to achieve a 2°C compatible trajectory, which would lead to the stranding of large-scale coal-based power plants; 3. if the reduction in coal power can be brought forward to 2020, the average annual coal-based power reduction required would be 104-155 TWh from 2020 to 2050 and the emissions could peak earlier; 4. early regulations in coal-based power would require accelerated promotion of alternatives between 2020 and 2030, with nuclear, wind and solar power expected to be the most promising alternatives. By presenting the stranding risk and viability of alternatives, we suggest that both the government and enterprises should remain cautious about making new investment in coal-based power sector.

A plant-by-plant strategy for high-ambition coal power phaseout in China

“…Continued coal expansion in the near term would largely increase the risk of stranded assets with the long-term climate goals 4,19 . However, we also recognize that in China, a total of 100 GW of coal plants are currently under construction and 106 GW planned 3 , in addition to the 160 GW of projects that have been suspended by the central government through a series of policies since 2016 20,21 .…”

“…As a result, accelerated retirement of coal plants creates higher risks of asset stranding in China. Potential continued coal expansion in the near-term further exacerbates the lock-in effect, which leads to larger economic impacts 4 .…”

“…The overwhelming magnitude of existing coal infrastructure makes it highly uncertain if China can decarbonize its heavily coal-reliant power system. While several studies have quantified emission reduction and technology transition pathways in the Chinese power system under different climate goals, they look at coal phaseout in aggregate capacity or generation terms [4][5][6][7][8] . Other global and regional studies have used plant-level data to improve estimates of committed emissions and fossil fuel phaseout pathways [9][10][11][12][13] as well as stranded assets 14 .…”

Beyond shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs) and representative concentration pathways (RCPs): climate policy implementation scenarios for Europe, the US and China

“…To this end, we looked for (1) the major emitters of greenhouse gases, since the policies and implementation experiences of such countries are of global importance; and (2) countries which have shown markedly different responses to climate mitigation, compared to one another; or (3) countries which have experienced dramatic shifts in implementationeither rapidly moving from a position of opposition or ambivalence regarding RE to strongly promoting itor shifting in the other direction, suddenly opposing RE and backing fossil fuels instead. With these criteria, we chose the following cases: (1) The United States, the world's second biggest annual emitter, whose governments flipped from providing cautious support to clean energy policies (under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama), to directly opposing them (under President Trump); and (2) China, the world's biggest annual emitter, which has shown strong and consistent support for cleaner energy, but whose projected expansion of coal power risks tipping the world beyond the Paris Agreement (Wang et al, 2020). 1 For Europe, which as a bloc is the world's third largest emitter, we selected two major economies which represent sharply opposing trajectories of European climate policy implementation: Spain, which moved from strongly supporting RE to strongly opposing it (Alonso et al, 2016), subsequently reinstating support following a change of government; and Germany, which moved from a low level of national support and strong dependence on fossil fuels to become Europe's most important advocate of the clean energy transition (Hake et al, 2015).…”

“…Nonetheless, extensive expansion of the coal industry is still anticipated. If China develops all of its projected new coal mines, the world is virtually guaranteed to exceed Paris Agreement temperature targets (Wang et al, 2020). However, China's recent announcement to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 (Mallapaty, 2020) implies the need to abandon both ongoing and projected new coal plants.…”