JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Sociological Theory.This essay attempts to chart the outlines of a major change in the basic assumptions of American social science which took place between 1930 and 1950, and to illustrate it by focusing primarily on the approach of social scientists to race, ethnic and "cultural" groups. The major formal concept involved is that of Culture, already well known by 1930 but becoming central, in a new and different meaning, by the eve of World War II. It is tempting to refer to this change as one of paradigms, but since some historians (perhaps fearful for the truth-value of their field) reach for their uzis at the sound of that word, it might be more prudent to cast light on my central polarity through categories offered by philosophers writing in the 1930s. The Harvard-Berkeley philosopher Stephen Pepper argued that every theory has a rootmetaphor, or basic structural analogy, which the theorizer draws from one "area of common-sense fact" and then generalizes to "understand the world" in general (Pepper 1942, pp. 90-114). Arthur Lovejoy offered a pentateuchal classification of the major elements composing any complex set of ideas: 1) assumptions, or inarticulate but stateable presuppositons; 2) dialectical motives, turns of reasoning or methodological assumptions; 3) metaphysical pathos, the sympathetic vibrations, or emotional resonances, aroused by an idea that give it persuasive force; 4) philosophical semantics, the unpacking of the rich language constituting a worldview; 5) the specific unit-ideas, propositions about the nature of things, which compose the larger worldviews (Lovejoy 1936). Lovejoy's system has been consigned to the attic of obsolete formulas, perhaps because the elements overlap so much as to be difficult to use; but also (I suspect) because most intellectual historians over the last generation have been less interested in this kind of analysis than in finding ways to Parson's language of structure is especially pervasive in Parsons (1960: especially 19-20, 163-71, 192-97, 250-53). The visualization of process as temporary disruption of structure is discussed, 12, 76-77.