Dynamical systems theory in cognitive science and neuroscience

Favela, Luis H.

doi:10.1111/phc3.12695

Cited by 27 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 97 publications

(108 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Dynamical systems theory is becoming increasingly popular in contemporary neuroscience (for a small sample see Breakspear 2017;Deco et al 2017;Honey and Sporns 2008;Izhikevich 2007;Rabinovich et al 2006;Sussillo 2014). In spite of the increased prominence in neuroscience research, discussion of dynamical systems theory in neuroscience among philosophers has been minimal (exceptions to this include Chemero and Silberstein 2008;Chirimuuta 2018;Favela 2019Favela , 2020Ross 2015). This is slightly odd given significant discussion of dynamical systems in cognitive science by philosophers (see Sect.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are many excellent general introductions to dynamical systems theory (e.g., Alligood et al 2000;Fuchs 2013;Guckenheimer and Holmes 1983;Strogatz 2015), as well as its applications in the mind sciences (e.g., Beer 2000;Chemero 2009;Clark 1997;Guastello et al 2011;Port 2006;Riley and Holden 2012;Thelen and Smith 1994). The current introduction is aimed at providing a general overview and giving a sense of the aspects of dynamical systems theory that will be most significant in later sections (Favela 2020). To begin, dynamical systems theory is a branch of mathematics that can evaluate both abstract and physical systems as they change over time.…”

Section: A Very Concise Introduction To Dynamical Systems Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In another example,Eliasmith (2010) mentions that dynamical systems theory can be utilized to illuminate how the brain implements computations, but does so from the perspective of cognitive science and does not discuss neural activity in terms of dynamics per se. As far as I am aware, issues pertaining to dynamical systems theory in terms of neuroscience proper have not been discussed until fairly recently (e.g.,Chemero and Silberstein, 2008;Chirimuuta 2018;Favela 2019Favela , 2020Ross 2015) and have not received nearly as much attention as in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind. Consequently, the topic of dynamical systems theory in neuroscience remains a relatively novel source of material for philosophers.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The dynamical renaissance in neuroscience

Favela

2020

Synthese

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although there is a substantial philosophical literature on dynamical systems theory in the cognitive sciences, the same is not the case for neuroscience. This paper attempts to motivate increased discussion via a set of overlapping issues. The first aim is primarily historical and is to demonstrate that dynamical systems theory is currently experiencing a renaissance in neuroscience. Although dynamical concepts and methods are becoming increasingly popular in contemporary neuroscience, the general approach should not be viewed as something entirely new to neuroscience. Instead, it is more appropriate to view the current developments as making central again approaches that facilitated some of neuroscience’s most significant early achievements, namely, the Hodgkin–Huxley and FitzHugh–Nagumo models. The second aim is primarily critical and defends a version of the “dynamical hypothesis” in neuroscience. Whereas the original version centered on defending a noncomputational and nonrepresentational account of cognition, the version I have in mind is broader and includes both cognition and the neural systems that realize it as well. In view of that, I discuss research on motor control as a paradigmatic example demonstrating that the concepts and methods of dynamical systems theory are increasingly and successfully being applied to neural systems in contemporary neuroscience. More significantly, such applications are motivating a stronger metaphysical claim, that is, understanding neural systems as being dynamical systems, which includes not requiring appeal to representations to explain or understand those phenomena. Taken together, the historical claim and the critical claim demonstrate that the dynamical hypothesis is undergoing a renaissance in contemporary neuroscience.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Very Concise Introduction To Dynamical Systems Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The dynamical renaissance in neuroscience

Favela

2020

Synthese

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…But this cannot be the case. DST categorically rejects the notion of representation or cognition as information processing (Favela, 2020). From the classics, we have the insight: 'rather than computation, cognitive processes may be dynamical systems; rather than computation, cognitive processes may be state-space evolution within these very different kinds of systems' (Van Gelder, 1995, p. 346).…”

Section: Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference

Hipólito

2022

Front. Psychol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This aim of this paper is two-fold: it critically analyses and rejects accounts blending active inference as theory of mind and enactivism; and it advances an enactivist-dynamic understanding of social cognition that is compatible with active inference. While some social cognition theories seemingly take an enactive perspective on social cognition, they explain it as the attribution of mental states to other people, by assuming representational structures, in line with the classic Theory of Mind (ToM). Holding both enactivism and ToM, we argue, entails contradiction and confusion due to two ToM assumptions widely known to be rejected by enactivism: that (1) social cognition reduces to mental representation and (2) social cognition is a hardwired contentful ‘toolkit’ or ‘starter pack’ that fuels the model-like theorising supposed in (1). The paper offers a positive alternative, one that avoids contradictions or confusion. After rejecting ToM-inspired theories of social cognition and clarifying the profile of social cognition under enactivism, that is without assumptions (1) and (2), the last section advances an enactivist-dynamic model of cognition as dynamic, real-time, fluid, contextual social action, where we use the formalisms of dynamical systems theory to explain the origins of socio-cognitive novelty in developmental change and active inference as a tool to demonstrate social understanding as generalised synchronisation.

show abstract

“…Coupling of eye and bodily movements Onset of motor control Kelso et al, 1998;Shenoy et al, 2013 Chemero andSilberstein, 2008;Vernazzani, 2019*;Favela, 2020b Coupling ratio Bimanual coordination (relative phase) Haken et al, 1985Chemero, 2000, 2001Kaplan and Craver, 2011*;Stepp et al, 2011;Zednik, 2011*;Lamb and Chemero, 2014;Golonka and Wilson, 2019*;Meyer, 2020 Strength of memory trace, salience of target, waiting time, stance Infant reaching (A-not-B error) Thelen et al, 2001Zednik, 2011Gervais, 2015;Verdejo, 2015;Venturelli, 2016;van Eck, 2018*;Meyer, 2020;Povich, in press* Potassium and sodium ion flows Neural excitability Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952;FitzHugh, 1961;Nagumo et al, 1962 Craver andKaplan, 2011*;Kaplan and Bechtel, 2011*;Kaplan and Craver, 2011*;Ross, 2015;Hochstein, 2017*;Favela, 2020a,b The explanans (first column) is the factor that explains. The explanandum (second column) is the phenomenon to be explained.…”

Section: Dynamical Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating Philosophy of Understanding With the Cognitive Sciences

Khalifa

Islam²,

Gamboa

et al. 2022

Front. Syst. Neurosci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.

show abstract

Dynamical systems theory in cognitive science and neuroscience

Cited by 27 publications

References 97 publications

The dynamical renaissance in neuroscience

The dynamical renaissance in neuroscience

Enactive-Dynamic Social Cognition and Active Inference

Integrating Philosophy of Understanding With the Cognitive Sciences

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About