Dynamic Volume-Hiding Encrypted Multi-Maps with Applications to Searchable Encryption

Amjad, Ghous; Patel, Sarvar; Persiano, Giuseppe; Yeo, Kyongmin; Yung, Moti

doi:10.56553/popets-2023-0025

Cited by 9 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 31 publications

(95 reference statements)

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“…If h w1 lies in the stash, then the server guesses that the client performed scenario (1). Otherwise, the server guesses that the client performed scenario (2). We now show that this attack has a constant distinguishing advantage.…”

Section: A1 a Simple Attackmentioning

confidence: 71%

Hermes: I/O-Efficient Forward-Secure Searchable Symmetric Encryption

Minaud,

Reichle

2023

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Dynamic Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) enables a user to outsource the storage of an encrypted database to an untrusted server, while retaining the ability to privately search and update the outsourced database. The performance bottleneck of SSE schemes typically comes from their I/O efficiency. Over the last decade, a line of work has substantially improved that bottleneck. However, all existing I/O-efficient SSE schemes have a common limitation: they are not forward-secure. Since the seminal work of Bost at CCS 2016, forward security has become a de facto standard in SSE. In the same article, Bost conjectures that forward security and I/O efficiency are incompatible. This explains the current status quo, where users are forced to make a difficult choice between security and efficiency. The central contribution of this paper it to show that, contrary to what the status quo suggests, forward security and I/O efficiency can be realized simultaneously. This result is enabled by two new key techniques. First, we make use of a controlled amount of client buffering, combined with a deterministic update schedule. Second, we introduce the notion of SSE supporting dummy updates. In combination, those two techniques offer a new path to realizing forward security, which is compatible with I/O efficiency. Our new SSE scheme, Hermes, achieves sublogarithmic I/O efficiency O log log N p , storage efficiency O (1), with standard leakage, as well as backward and forward security. Practical experiments confirm that Hermes achieves excellent performance.

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Section: A1 a Simple Attackmentioning

confidence: 71%

Hermes: I/O-Efficient Forward-Secure Searchable Symmetric Encryption

Minaud,

Reichle

2023

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…It is also possible (and perhaps conceptually simpler) to mask this leakage by using volume-hiding techniques such as padding and encrypted multi-maps (EMMs) [1,11,20,27,28]. This would incur a degradation in search performance, and it is up to the designer to decide on a suitable trade-off between performance and leakage.…”

Section: D3 Discussion On the Leakage Profile Of Twinsse Oxtmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This allows it to be instantiated from any existing conjunctive SSE scheme, including OXT [7]. To the best of our knowledge, such a generic transformation from a conjunctive SSE scheme to an SSE scheme for general and complex Boolean queries has not been studied before in the SSE literature 1 .…”

Section: Our Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

TWo-IN-one-SSE: Fast, Scalable and Storage-Efficient Searchable Symmetric Encryption for Conjunctive and Disjunctive Boolean Queries

Bag

Talapatra

Rastogi

et al. 2023

PoPETs

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Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) supports efficient yet secure query processing over outsourced symmetrically encrypted databases without the need for decryption. A longstanding open question has been the following: can we design a fast, scalable, linear storage and low-leakage SSE scheme that efficiently supports arbitrary Boolean queries over encrypted databases? In this paper, we present the design, analysis and prototype implementation of the first SSE scheme that efficiently supports conjunctive, disjunctive and more general Boolean queries (in both the conjunctive and disjunctive normal forms) while scaling smoothly to extremely large encrypted databases, and while incurring linear storage overheads and supporting extremely fast query processing in practice. We quantify the leakage of our proposal via a rigorous cryptographic analysis and argue that it achieves security against a well-known class of leakage-abuse and volume analysis attacks. Finally, we demonstrate the storage-efficiency and scalability of our proposed scheme by presenting experimental results of a prototype implementation of our scheme over large real-world databases.

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“…This motivates the research on leakage-abuse attacks [5,10,21,23,33,34,40,41,54] that exploit leakages to undermine security guarantees. In response, some literature develops leakage-suppression techniques [2,13,18,22,26,27,38,46] to counteract the above attacks. However, these techniques have rather high overheads and focus on single-keyword searches.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(1) We are the first to introduce the concept of AUHME and design a selectively-semantically secure AUHME scheme. (2) We propose the first conjunctive DSSE scheme HDXT that hides KPRP while preserving sub-linear search efficiency. HDXT also achieves forward privacy and backward privacy with the level of at least Type-II.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Result-pattern-hiding Conjunctive Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Forward and Backward Privacy

Yuan

Zuo

Cui

et al. 2023

PoPETs

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Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) enables the data owner to outsource its database (document sets) to an untrusted server and make searches and updates securely and efficiently. Conjunctive DSSE can process conjunctive queries that return the documents containing multiple keywords. However, a conjunctive search could leak the keyword pair result pattern (KPRP), where attackers can learn which documents contain any two keywords involved in the query. File-injection attack shows that KPRP can be utilized to recover searched keywords. To protect data effectively, DSSE should also achieve forward privacy, i.e., hides the link between updates to previous searches, and backward privacy, i.e., prevents deleted entries being accessed by subsequent searches. Otherwise, the attacker could recover updated/searched keywords and records. However, no conjunctive DSSE scheme in the literature can hide KPRP in sub-linear search efficiency while guaranteeing forward and backward privacy. In this work, we propose the first sub-linear KPRP-hiding conjunctive DSSE scheme (named HDXT) with both forward and backward privacy guarantees. To achieve these three security properties, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive: Attribute-updatable Hidden Map Encryption (AUHME). AUHME enables HDXT to efficiently and securely perform conjunctive queries and update the database in an oblivious way. In comparison with previous work that has weaker security guarantees, HDXT shows comparable, and in some cases, even better performance.

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Dynamic Volume-Hiding Encrypted Multi-Maps with Applications to Searchable Encryption

Cited by 9 publications

References 31 publications

Hermes: I/O-Efficient Forward-Secure Searchable Symmetric Encryption

Hermes: I/O-Efficient Forward-Secure Searchable Symmetric Encryption

TWo-IN-one-SSE: Fast, Scalable and Storage-Efficient Searchable Symmetric Encryption for Conjunctive and Disjunctive Boolean Queries

Result-pattern-hiding Conjunctive Searchable Symmetric Encryption with Forward and Backward Privacy

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