Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility

Feng, Felix Zhiyu; Westerfield, Mark M.

doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.12.006

Journal of Financial Economics

2021

DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.12.006

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Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility

Felix Zhiyu Feng

Mark M. Westerfield

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Cited by 16 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 56 publications

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“…(2012), Zhu (2012), Green and Taylor (2016), He et al. (2017), Varas (2018), Marinovic and Varas (2019), Szydlowski (2019), Gryglewicz, Mayer, and Morellec (2020), Mayer (2022), Feng and Westerfield (2021), and Feng et al. (2021).…”

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Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering

Gryglewicz¹,

Mayer

2023

The Journal of Finance

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Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.

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Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering

Gryglewicz¹,

Mayer

2023

The Journal of Finance

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Risk management and optimal investment with inalienable human capital

Yang,

Zhuo,

Zhang

2024

Finance Research Letters

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Enhanced management information disclosure responsibilities and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from the accountability system for errors in China

Liu,

Lin,

2024

International Review of Economics & Finance

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Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility

Cited by 16 publications

References 56 publications

Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering

Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering

Risk management and optimal investment with inalienable human capital

Enhanced management information disclosure responsibilities and corporate risk-taking: Evidence from the accountability system for errors in China

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