Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation: Time Inconsistency, Moral Hazard, and Political Environments

Lim, Claire S. H.; Yürükoğlu, Ali

doi:10.1086/695474

Cited by 59 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…There is empirical evidence that, due to such regulatory hold-up, utilities underinvest in infrastructure that improves reliability (Lim and Yurukoglu 2015); this could lead to inefficiently low prices.…”

Section: Are Retail Electricity or Natural Gas Prices Too Low (Or Higmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap

Gerarden

Newell

Stavins

2017

Journal of Economic Literature

298

105

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Section: Are Retail Electricity or Natural Gas Prices Too Low (Or Higmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap

Gerarden

Newell

Stavins

2017

Journal of Economic Literature

298

105

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“…Market power cannot be avoided in this way. Instead, strong government action is required (Joskow, 2007;Joskow and Wolfram, 2012;Lim and Yurukoglu, 2017), for example, in the form of publicly run providers 2 with a regulated pricing strategy.…”

Section: Optimal Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxation of Economic Rents

Schwerhoff

Edenhofer

Fleurbaey

2019

Journal of Economic Surveys

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Economic rents have long been identified as an efficient tax base. In addition, the recent literature documents that rent income is highly concentrated and that rents are quickly increasing. Rent taxation thus seems attractive for reasons of both efficiency and equity. Nevertheless, rent taxation remains a marginal topic in research and policy making. In a systematic review of the neoclassical literature on different rent types, we find that some types of rents reflect inefficiencies and should thus be minimized, while others reward investments and should be supported in line with social welfare. What remains for taxation are land rents, one of the few true scarcity rents. Land rents have significant potential to improve the efficiency of the tax system. We then begin to develop a comprehensive theory of land rent taxation by identifying relevant efficiency and equity effects. The interaction of many of these effects remains unexplored, which might explain policymakers' hesitation in using land taxes to date.

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“…[1996]; Guthrie [2006]; Leaver [2009]; Borenstein et al . [2012]; Abito [2016]; Lim and Yurukoglu [2018]). Non‐academic papers providing recommendations for utilities and commissions for dealing with rate shock include Graves et al .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other work on retail pricing decisions for utilities includes Knittel [2003], which examines cross-subsidization consistent with interest group pressure, and Levinson and Silva [2019], which examines how price structures might respond to concerns about income inequality. More generally, a long literature has examined utility and regulator behavior (Joskow et al [1996]; Guthrie [2006]; Leaver [2009]; ; Abito [2016]; Lim and Yurukoglu [2018]). Non-academic papers providing recommendations for utilities and commissions for dealing with rate shock include Graves et al [2007] and Kolbe et al [2013].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shock Value: Bill Smoothing and Energy Price Pass‐Through

Hausman

2019

The J Industrial Economics

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Energy prices are volatile, affect every consumer and industry in the economy, and are impacted by regulations including gas taxes and carbon pricing. Like the pass‐through literature in general, the growing energy pass‐through literature focuses on marginal prices. However, multi‐part pricing is common in energy retail pricing. I examine the retail natural gas market, showing that while marginal prices exhibit full or nearly full pass‐through, fixed fees exhibit negative pass‐through. This is consistent with the stated desire by utilities and regulators to prevent ‘bill shock.’ I discuss implications for pass‐through estimation and for proposed alternative pricing structures for regulated utilities.

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Dynamic Natural Monopoly Regulation: Time Inconsistency, Moral Hazard, and Political Environments

Cited by 59 publications

References 29 publications

Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap

Assessing the Energy-Efficiency Gap

Taxation of Economic Rents

Shock Value: Bill Smoothing and Energy Price Pass‐Through

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