Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress

You, Hye Young

doi:10.1111/ecpo.12223

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 63 publications

(102 reference statements)

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“…Foreign commercial principals, including firms and trade associations, have been exempted from the FARA during the enactment of the LDA. Studies including You (2022You ( , 2020 and Lee (2022) show that most foreign-connected corporate lobbying is reported under the LDA. Based on FARA data obtained from the Foreign Lobby Watch project by Opensecrets.com, only 4 Canadian commercial entities disclosed their lobbying with the FARA from 2016 to 2020.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobilization and Strategies: Comparing Trade Lobbying in the US and Canada

Lee

Stuckatz

2023

Comparative Political Studies

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Do US lobbying patterns extend to other countries? To date no study has systematically compared US lobbying patterns with those of other countries using observational data. Taking advantage of similar lobbying disclosure rules in the US and Canada, we create a cross-country lobbying dataset. We focus on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) to control for timing, salience, and issue scope. This helps us attribute differences in firm mobilization and trade lobbying strategies across the two countries to differences in political institutions. Strikingly different USMCA lobbying patterns emerge. Within the same industry, trade associations, the executive branch, and in-house lobbyists play a larger role in Canada. Meanwhile, well-established determinants of US lobbying fail to explain patterns of mobilization and the use of external lobbyists in Canada. These findings provide insights into comparative lobbying studies and indicate that some stylized facts about lobbying are unique features of the US political system.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobilization and Strategies: Comparing Trade Lobbying in the US and Canada

Lee

Stuckatz

2023

Comparative Political Studies

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“…First, lobbying may leverage legislative procedure to exert agenda control, facilitating or blocking a proposal’s advancement by lowering or raising institutional roadblocks (Anzia and Jackman 2013; Garlick 2016; Powell and Grimmer 2016). Second, lobbying may promote or inhibit a proposal’s success through vote buying, or by securing the votes of enough legislators to pass or defeat the proposal (Schnakenberg 2017; You, N.d. ).…”

Section: How Lobbying Can Influence Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Despite scholars’ ultimate interest in the relationship between aggregate lobbying activity and legislative outcomes, most studies focus on the strategies and tactics organized interests direct toward individual legislators, such as making campaign contributions (Fouirnaies 2018; Fouirnaies and Hall 2018; Powell and Grimmer 2016), directly contacting legislators and their staffs (Miller 2021; Wiener 2020; You, N.d. ), mobilizing constituents (Bergan 2009), subsidizing legislative effort (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall and Miler 2008), and leveraging network connections (Blanes i Vidal, Mirko, and Christian 2012; McCrain 2018).…”

Section: How Lobbying Can Influence Outcomesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Lobbying Affect Bill Advancement? Evidence from Three State Legislatures

Butler

Miller

2021

Political Research Quarterly

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Many studies consider the effect of lobbying on the behavior of individual legislators, but few studies demonstrate a relationship between lobbying and the ultimate dispositions of bills by the legislature. One challenge to establishing this latter relationship is data scarcity, as few legislatures systematically collect and publish information on organized interests’ lobbying activities on each bill. We provide new insights on lobbying by using data from Colorado, Nebraska, and Wisconsin that records the positions organized interests take on proposals in those states’ legislatures. We find that organized interests’ lobbying predicts outcomes, especially when lobbying is directed against a proposal. We also use our data to test whether lobbying succeeds by building support among legislators (i.e., vote buying) or by affecting a proposal’s advancement through the legislative process (i.e., agenda control). We find that lobbying does not buy the votes of legislators on the committees of jurisdiction for each bill, but lobbying does strongly predict what bills make it onto the agenda. Our findings contribute to ongoing discussions about money and politics, bias in representation, and legislator behavior.

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“…Chalmers (2013) witnessed the same urgency among lobbyists in the European Union: “Lobbyists [...] explain that there is an important premium on providing timely information in the EU. Information that is too late loses all of its value.” The importance of timing in lobbying has been recently highlighted in empirical studies of dynamic lobbying (Kim, Stuckatz, and Wolters 2020; You 2017, 2020). Yet, most theories of informational lobbying are either static or do not consider that delaying policies can impose costs on both legislators and lobbyists.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Friendly Lobbying under Time Pressure

Awad

Minaudier

2022

American J Political Sci

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Lobbyists often target legislators who are aligned with them rather than opponents. The choice of whom to lobby affects both what information becomes available to legislators and how much influence special interest groups exert on policies. However, the conditions under which aligned legislators are targeted are not well understood. We investigate how the pressure to conclude policies quickly affects the strategic decision of whom to lobby. We derive conditions on the cost of delaying policies and on the distribution of legislators' preferences for lobbyists to prefer targeting allies. We show that the use of allied intermediaries has important implications for the duration of policymaking and the quality of policies. Counterintuitively, an increase in time pressure can increase the duration of policymaking and a longer duration does not always lead to better informed policies.

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Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress

Cited by 6 publications

References 63 publications

Mobilization and Strategies: Comparing Trade Lobbying in the US and Canada

Mobilization and Strategies: Comparing Trade Lobbying in the US and Canada

Does Lobbying Affect Bill Advancement? Evidence from Three State Legislatures

Friendly Lobbying under Time Pressure

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