Dynamic inventory and pricing policy in a capacitated stochastic inventory system with fixed ordering cost

Chao, Xiuli; Yang, Baimei; Xu, Yifan

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2011.12.002

Cited by 23 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In Gallego and Scheller-Wolf [ 8 ], the structure of the policy between the bands is further refined using two numbers s and s ′ in four possible regions. Chao et al [ 9 ] have studied a dynamic inventory and pricing optimization problem in a periodic review inventory system with setup cost and finite ordering capacity in each period. Gavish and Graves [ 10 ] study one-product production/inventory problem with a fixed setup cost under continuous review policy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Optimal Policy of Single-Period Inventory Management with Two Suppliers

Yang

Sui

Zhu

2014

The Scientific World Journal

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We study a single-period inventory control problem with two independent suppliers. With the first supplier, the buyer incurs a high variable cost but negligible fixed cost; with the second supplier, the buyer incurs a lower variable cost but a positive fixed cost. At the same time, the ordering quantity is limited. We develop the optimal inventory control policy when the holding and shortage cost function is convex. We also conduct some numerical experiments to explore the effects of the fixed setup cost K and the ordering capacity Q on the optimal control policy.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Optimal Policy of Single-Period Inventory Management with Two Suppliers

Yang

Sui

Zhu

2014

The Scientific World Journal

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“…Several studies have been conducted to extend the analysis of production-inventory systems, including Zheng and Zipkin (1990) [10], Perez and Zipkin (1997) [6], Benjaafar, Elhafsi and de Vericourt( 2004)[1]. It is also related to the research on coordination of pricing and inventory replenishment, including Federgruen and Heching (1999) [4], Chen and Simchi-Levi (2004) [3], Chao, Yang and Xu (2012) [2] have made some extensions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal policy for a production-inventory system with price shift and setup cost

Yang

2012

2012 IEEE International Conference on Computer Science and Automation Engineering

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We consider a continuous review production-inventory system with price shift and setup cost, which is controlled by a (s,s',S) policy. Unsatisfied demand is lost. When the machine is on, the inventory can be sold at two different prices. While the machine is off, the inventory only can be sold at the high price.We show the method to find the optimal (s,s',S) control policy for this system and develop an efficient algorithm to compute the optimal control parameters.

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“…Salesforce management has been vastly studied in the analytical marketing literature. Chao et al [4] studied a dynamic inventory and pricing optimization problem in a periodic review inventory system with setup cost and finite ordering capacity in each period. Huang et al [11] modeled a dual-channel supply chain that experiences a disruption in demand and examined changes in the pricing and production quantity decisions.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Traditional supply chain models are based on risk neutrality, where decision makers make decisions to maximize their expected profits (see [4], [6], [13]). While it is generally accepted that decision makers are risk-averse, it is also known that estimating the exact utility function of a decision maker is not easy, if possible at all.…”

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confidence: 99%

Compensation plan, pricing and production decisions with inventory-dependent salvage value, and asymmetric risk-averse sales agent

Chen¹,

Wang²,

Huang³

et al. 2018

Journal of Industrial &Amp; Management Optimization

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In this paper, we investigate the joint decision on production and pricing, and the compensation strategy of a supply chain, where the manufacturer relies on a risk-averse sales agent to sell the products. The sales outcome is determined by the sales agent's selling effort and the product price. Most of the previous research about salesforce assumes that the risk attitude to an agent is known to each other and the salvage value is a constant. In this study, we have considered that the salvage value is a function of inventory, and both of the sales agent's selling effort and risk attitude are their private information on the general framework of dual information asymmetric. With the help of revelation principle and principal-agent theory, we have been able to derive the optimal compensation contracts, and joint decision on production and pricing for the manufacturer. Analyzing them and comparing to the symmetric scenario, we found that only the optimal production strategy and the manufacturer's profit depended on the variation rate of salvage value. When the manufacturer comes across asymmetric risk-averse sales agents its profit decreases, whereas the sales agent with private information obtains higher income but exerts less effort, which implies the value of information. The results also mean that the manufacturer should not only focus on offering a lower commission rate to the more risk-averse sales agent, but also on screening his risk information.

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Dynamic inventory and pricing policy in a capacitated stochastic inventory system with fixed ordering cost

Cited by 23 publications

References 18 publications

Research on Optimal Policy of Single-Period Inventory Management with Two Suppliers

Research on Optimal Policy of Single-Period Inventory Management with Two Suppliers

Optimal policy for a production-inventory system with price shift and setup cost

Compensation plan, pricing and production decisions with inventory-dependent salvage value, and asymmetric risk-averse sales agent

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