Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey

Long, Ngo Van

doi:10.1007/s13235-010-0003-2

Cited by 120 publications

(63 citation statements)

References 141 publications

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“…Van Long [46] provides a survey of the use of dynamic games in the exploitation of renewable and exhaustible resources. It includes dynamic games at the industry level (oligopoly, cartel versus fringe, tragedy of the commons) and at the international level (tariffs on exhaustible resources, fish wars, entry deterrence).…”

Section: Literature Review and Open Endsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study of Macroeconomics of Climate Change

Engwerda¹

2012

SSRN Journal

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In this note we sketch a dynamic framework within which the discussion on the macro economic effects of climate change take place. The problem setting is characterized by scientific uncertainties about the development of climate, potential large economic losses and human beings having their specific features. Some considerations about climate change, macroeconomics and their relationship are given. A characteristic feature of the problem setting is that there are multiple decision makers interacting in a dynamic world with large uncertainties. Problems of this type have been studied extensively by (dynamic) game theory. A rough literature review is provided and some items open for future research are indicated.

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Section: Literature Review and Open Endsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study of Macroeconomics of Climate Change

Engwerda¹

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…For two simplified, though still non-linear, versions of this model [24] considered the existence of Markov perfect Nash equilibria. Except for the usual cooperative and non-cooperative information structures (see, e.g., [29] for a general survey) also problems have been addressed where one fisherman has a first mover advantage (see, e.g., [2]). Furthermore, incentive strategies that establish the efficient solution as an incentive equilibrium have been developed (see, e.g., [13]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stabilization of an uncertain simple fishery management game

Engwerda

2018

Fisheries Research

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This note analyzes in a fishery management problem the effects of relaxing one of the usual assumptions in the literature of dynamic games. Specifically, the assumption that players restrict to strategies that stabilize the system. Previous works in the literature have shown that feedback Nash equilibria can exist in which a player can improve unilaterally by choosing a feedback control for which the closed-loop system is unstable. This paper considers in some more detail the implication this setting has in the framework of a simple fishery management. It is shown that if the fishermen are not short-sighted in their valuation of future profits, the considered approach implies a division of them into two groups. One group going for maximal profits and the other group taking care of the imposed stability constraint.To see how noise might impact these results we additionally consider a framework where fishermen take into account the possibility that the fish growth might be corrupted by external factors. We consider a deterministic approach of dealing with noise in this set-up.The model predicts that the more people are involved in the group taking care of the stabilization constraint, the less active they get. Furthermore it predicts that the natural reaction of any of these persons is to increase his activities if he expects more noise. But that this activity is reduced, and partly replaced by more active control policies by group members, if the size of the group increases. Activity of fishermen going for maximal profits is not affected by noise expectations.

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“…7 See the surveys of dynamic pollutions games in Jorgensen, Martin-Herran and Zaccour (2010) or Long (2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anticipated international environmental agreements

Açıkgöz

Benchekroun

2017

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Anticipated International Environmental Agreements AbstractConsider a situation in which countries anticipate an international environmental agreement (IEA) to be in effect sometime in the future. What is the impact of the future IEA on current emissions after its announcement? We show that the answer to this question is ambiguous. We examine four types of IEAs that aim to reduce pollution stock in the environment. IEA type 1 sets a level of emissions, IEA type 2 and IEA type 3 set a percentage and a uniform cut vis-à-vis the business-as-usual policy respectively. IEA type 4 sets the policy that maximizes future joint benefits of the signatories. We show that all of these agreements reach their goal in the long run, but the intended benefits of these IEAs can potentially be offset by the anticipatory noncooperative response of the signatories, leading to an environmental degradation in the short run. Which IEA is preferable depends on the targeted level emissions during the phase of cooperation. When this target is above a certain threshold, welfare under IEA type 1 is larger than under IEA type 2 which is larger than under IEA type 3. Moreover, the highest level of welfare that can be attained under IEA type 1 is above the highest level of welfare achieved by any one of the other three IEAs.JEL-Codes: Q530, Q540, Q580, Q590.

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Dynamic Games in the Economics of Natural Resources: A Survey

Abstract: Exhaustible resources, Renewable resources, Over-exploitation, Property rights,

Cited by 120 publications

References 141 publications

Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study of Macroeconomics of Climate Change

Prospects of Tools from Differential Games in the Study of Macroeconomics of Climate Change

Stabilization of an uncertain simple fishery management game

Anticipated international environmental agreements

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