Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Abstract

In terms of the number of signatories, one observes both large and small international environmental agreements. The theoretical literature, based on game theory, discusses different concepts and mechanisms regarding stability of coalitions. The conclusion has been reached that in all circumstances, under farsightedness, both large and small stable coalitions can occur. This theory is based on behavioural reaction patterns but does not take account of the interaction with the dynamics of emission adjustments. This paper shows that when these two dynamical processes are integrated, large and small stable coalitions can still occur but only if the costs of emissions are relatively unimportant as compared to the costs of abatement.JEL codes: Q2, C70, F42

Technology spillovers and stability of international climate coalitions

“…A general observation from this literature is that rather inefficient partial coalitions tend to emerge and the coalition with all the members may not be attained. De Zeeuw (2008) widens the scope to a dynamic context and confirms that large stable coalitions can only emerge when the gains from cooperation are small. Thus, even with transfers, full cooperation on emission abatement is hard to establish.…”

Sustainability and International Environmental Agreements

“…As mentioned earlier, the membership of the young generation is expected to inherit the membership. So that if there are   signatories in an IEA in Period 1, the expected coalition formation in Period 2 remains the same 7) . With this assumption, the old generation could predict the emissions level and the welfare of the young generation.…”

“…Germain et al 2003;de Zeeuw, 2008;Rubio and Ulph, 2007) employ dynamic models to describe human development in the infinite horizon. These models, pursues the maximised over-generational welfare, neglect the core of sustainability which pursues the non-declining welfare.…”

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

“…Therefore, we use an alternative set of stability criteria referred to in the literature as "farsightedness" under which when a country considers leaving an IEA, it takes into account the implications on other countries' adhesion to the IEA. We analyze the stability of coalitions using the farsighted stability concept as used by Eyckmans (2003), Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006), Osmani andTol (2009) andde Zeeuw (2008) in the context of environmental agreements. In this paper, we shall focus on the case of a small number of players because we believe that it is in those situations where the assumption of farsightedness seems most realistic.…”